Out of the Legal Wilderness: Peacetime Espionage, International Law and the Existence of Customary Exceptions by Navarrete, Inaki, Mr & Buchan, Russell
Cornell International Law Journal
Volume 51
Number 4 Winter 2019 Article 4
Out of the Legal Wilderness: Peacetime Espionage,
International Law and the Existence of Customary
Exceptions
Inaki Navarrete Mr
McGill University, Faculty of Law, inaki.navarrete@mail.mcgill.ca
Russell Buchan
University of Sheffield, r.j.buchan@sheffield.ac.uk
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj
Part of the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell International Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information,
please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Navarrete, Inaki Mr and Buchan, Russell (2019) "Out of the Legal Wilderness: Peacetime Espionage, International Law and the
Existence of Customary Exceptions," Cornell International Law Journal: Vol. 51 : No. 4 , Article 4.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj/vol51/iss4/4
Out of the Legal Wilderness: Peacetime
Espionage, International Law and the
Existence of Customary
Exceptions
Ifiaki Navarretet & Russell Buchan:
This Article demonstrates that peacetime espionage does not benefit
from permissive customary international law exceptions. The mainstream
view contends that, though peacetime espionage may contravene interna-
tional law, developments in customary international law (CIL) nevertheless
undercut State responsibility for such conduct. The gist of this view is that
acts of espionage benefit from permissive CIL exceptions because its prac-
tice is widespread and accepted within the international society. However,
the mainstream literature has rarely-if ever-meaningfully engaged with
the practice of espionage in an effort to tease out the objective and subjec-
tive elements supportive of customary espionage exceptions. This Article
closes this gap and debunks the mainstream view. We show that, although
widespread, most acts of espionage are committed in secret and, as such,
they cannot qualify as State practice for the purpose of CIL formation. We
further demonstrate that States have failed to issue expressions of the sub-
jective element in support of customary espionage exceptions. We con-
clude by suggesting that, while States are entitled to develop customary
espionage exceptions in the future, for now they have yet to come out of the
legal wilderness.
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Introduction
Peacetime espionage represents a serious conundrum for international
legal scholars. On the one hand, while States have failed to implement
international law that directly and specifically regulates espionage, schol-
ars must recognize that States inhabit an international society that com-
prises multiple international laws designed to protect States' sovereign
equality. 1 Because of its inherently intrusive nature, espionage is likely to
run into conflict with a number of these rules. On the other hand, these
scholars perceive the world order to be unpredictable and hostile.2 In this
environment, they are reluctant to allow international law to curtail States'
ability to undertake espionage, which is regarded "as a vital necessity in
the national security process" because it sheds light on the capabilities and
intentions of other actors within the international society.
3
The conundrum for scholars is therefore clear: disavowing the applica-
tion of international law to espionage undermines the authority and integ-
rity of the international legal order but at the same time applying
international law to espionage deprives States of the national security ben-
1. See, e.g., ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD 130, 130
(1986) (arguing the principle of the sovereign equality of States-as enshrined in Article
2(1) of the United Nations (UN) Charter 1945-is considered to be "the fundamental
premise on which all international law rests.").
2. Id. at 131.
3. W. Hays Parks, The International Law of Intelligence Collection, in NATIONAL
SECURITY LAW 433, 433 (John N. Moore & Robert Turner eds., 1990).
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efits afforded by this practice. 4
How have international legal scholars resolved this problematique?
The short answer is: they haven't. Rather than tackling head-on the ques-
tion of whether espionage is compatible with international law, scholars
have instead preferred to sidestep this debate and avoid it entirely. In
doing so, they have determined that "international law is silent on the sub-
ject"'5 of espionage, that is, that this is a practice that is neither "legal nor
illegal under international law."'6 In 2007, for example, Radsan-a former
assistant general counsel at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)-was so
exasperated by the predicament that espionage creates for international
lawyers that he exhorted: "Accepting that espionage is beyond the law, we
should move on to other projects-with grace."7
International legal scholars have not been able to walk away from espi-
onage. New and more effective means and methods of espionage keep
emerging and these developments force espionage into the international
legal spotlight. Take for instance the dawn of cyberspace and the potential
for cyber-enabled espionage. Cyberspace is a domain that is now widely
utilized by States to store massive quantities of confidential information.
Given the speed and ease at which this information can be accessed, cou-
pled with the fact that cyber espionage is a relatively risk-free enterprise
insofar as it can be committed remotely, the practice has "metastasize[d]" 8
in the last decade and "cyber espionage projects [are] now prevalent." 9
Compelled to grasp the nettle, there has been a flurry of international
legal scholarship in recent years examining the applicability of interna-
tional law to peacetime espionage. 10 Increasingly, scholars have conceded
4. Simon Chesterman, The Spy Who Came in from the Cold War: Intelligence and
International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1071, 1072-73 (2006) (Chesterman refers to this
conundrum as the "elephant in the room" for international lawyers).
5. Gary Brown, Spying and Fighting in Cyberspace: What is Which?, 8J. NAT'L SEC. L.
& POL'Y 621, 621 (2016). See also Richard A. Falk, Foreword to ESSAYS ON ESPIONAGE AND
INTERNATIONAL LAw V (Roland J. Stranger ed., 1962) ("Traditional international law is
remarkably oblivious to the peacetime practice of espionage.").
6. A. John Radsan, The Unresolved Equation of Espionage and International Law, 28
MICHIGAN J. INT'L L. 595, 596 (2007). A number of authors have proposed their own
criteria that can be used to determine the legality of peacetime espionage under interna-
tional law. See, e.g., Ashley S. Deeks, Confronting and Adapting: Intelligence Agencies and
International Law, 102 VA. L. REV. 599, 605 (2016); Ido Kilovaty, World Wide Web of
Exploitations: The Case of Peacetime Cyber Espionage Operations under International Law:
Towards a Contextual Approach, 18 COLUM. ScL. & TECH. L. REV. 42, 42 (2016); Darien
Pun, Rethinking Espionage in the Modern Era, 18 CHI. J. INT'L L. 353, 353 (2017).
7. Radsan, supra note 6, at 597.
8. David P. Fidler, Economic Cyber Espionage and International Law: Controversies
Involving Government Acquisition of Trade Secrets through Cyber Technologies, 17 ASIL
INSIGHTS 10 (2013).
9. Pete Warren, State-Sponsored Cyber Espionage Projects Now Prevalent, THE GUARD-
IAN (Aug. 30, 2012), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2012/aug/30/state-
sponsored-cyber-espionage-prevalent [https://perma.cc/AQ8N-7W9B].
10. See, e.g., Russell Buchan, The International Legal Regulation of State-Sponsored
Cyber Espionage, in INTERNATIONAL CYBER NoRms: LEGAL, POLICY & INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVES
(Anna-Maria Osula & Henry R6igas eds, 2016); KRIANGSAK KTTICHAISAREE, PUBLIC
INTERNTIONAL LAW AND CYBERSPACE (2016); Katharina Ziolkowski, Cyber Espionage- New
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that certain forms of espionage transgress international law.1 However,
still wedded to the view that espionage is a necessary national security
tool, they have overwhelmingly concluded that, while different forms of
espionage violate different international legal rules, this illegality is never-
theless "undercut" and nullified by developments in customary interna-
tional law (CIL). 12 This has now become the mainstream account of
espionage.
This view holds that general and consistent practice of States acting
out of a sense of legal right has carved out customary espionage "excep-
tions"13 (or "defenses"'14) to those primary rules of international law. The
Tendencies in Public International Law, in PEACETIME REGIME FOR STATE ACTIVITIES IN
CYBERSPACE: INTERNATIONAL LAW, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND DIPLOMACY (Katharina
Ziolkowski ed., 2013); Jared Beim, Enforcing a Prohibition on International Espionage, 18
CHI. J. INT'L L. 647, 647 (2018); Gary Brown & Keira Poellet, The Customary Interna-
tional Law of Cyberspace, 6 STRATEGIC STUD. Q. 126, 133-39 (2012); Ashley Deeks, An
International Legal Framework for Surveillance, 55 VA. J. INT'L L. 291, 291 (2015); Craig
Forcese, Pragmatism and Principle: Intelligence Agencies and International Law, 102 VA L.
REv. ONLINE 67, 68 (2016); Chantal Khalil, Thinking Intelligently about Intelligence: A
Model Global Framework Protecting Privacy, 47 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 919, 939 (2015);
Ifiaki Navarrete, L'Espionnage en Temps de Paix en Droit International Public, 53 CANA-
DIAN Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (2016); Patrick C.R. Terry, "Absolute Friends": United States Espio-
nage Against Germany and Public International Law, 28 REVUE QUEBECOISE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL 173, 173 (2015); Robert D. Williams, Spy Game Change: Cyber Networks,
Intelligence Collection, and Covert Action, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1162, 1162 (2011);
RUSSELL BUCHAN, CYBER ESPIONAGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2018); FABIEN LAFOUASSE,
L'ESPIONNAGE DANS LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL (2012).
11. Beim, supra note 10, at 653.
12. See, e.g., Spencer M. Beresford, Surveillance Aircraft and Satellites: A Problem of
International Law, 27 J. AIR L. & COM. 107, 114 (1961) (speaking of aerial espionage
and arguing that "espionage is condoned by custom and tacitly accepted by long-contin-
ued international practice and forbearance."); Deeks, supra note 10, at 305 ("[T]he wide-
spread and long-standing practice of spying-committed by many states in different
regions of the world during time periods that both precede and post-date the UN Char-
ter-undercuts arguments that these customary principles either were intended to pro-
hibit espionage at the time they developed or should be deemed to do so today.");
Catherine Lotrionte, Countering State-Sponsored Cyber Economic Espionage Under Inter-
national Law, 40 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 443, 477 (2015) ("State practice through-
out history . . . supports the legitimacy of spying. Nowhere in international law is
peaceful espionage prohibited;" "By extension, cyber espionage in line with the same
objectives of traditional espionage may be seen as acceptable state practice under inter-
national law as long as such activities stay within the bounds of acceptable limits analo-
gous to those rules of traditional espionage that have been accepted by states."); Myres S.
McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell & W. Michael Reisman, The Intelligence Function and
World Public Order, 46 TEMPLE L.Q. 365, 394 (1973) (suggesting "a deep but reluctant
admission of the lawfulness of... intelligence gathering when conducted within [cer-
tain] customary . . . limits."); Alexander Melnitzky, Defending America against Chinese
Cyber Espionage through the Use of Active Defenses, 20 C~ARDozo J. INT'L & COMP L. 537,
564 (2012) (speaking of an espionage exception); Glenn Sulmasy & John Yoo, Counter-
intuitive: Intelligence Operations and International Law, 28 MICH. J. INT'L L. 625, 628
(2007).
13. The ICJ has consistently used the term "exception" to describe developments in
customary international law that modify the scope of international legal rules. See, e.g.,
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment,
1986 .CJ. 14, 207 (June 27).
14. Craig Forcese, Spies Without Borders: International Law and Intelligence Collec-
tion, 5J. NAT'L SEC. L. & POL'Y 179, 203 (2011).
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gist of the argument is that, because almost all States spy almost all of the
time, acts of peacetime espionage that conflict with international law are
by that very fact lawful.' 5 Surprisingly, proponents of customary espio-
nage exceptions have rarely, if ever, meaningfully engaged with the practice
of espionage in an effort to tease out whether there is the necessary State
practice and opinio juris to support their existence. The mainstream view
has thus gone unchallenged and unexamined.
The objective of this Article is to close this gap and debunk the thesis
currently perpetuated within international legal scholarship that peacetime
espionage is permissible because customary espionage exceptions have
emerged in relation to prohibitive international law. In pursuit of this
objective, this Article is structured as follows.
Part I provides a working definition of peacetime espionage to frame
the scope of this Article. It shows that peacetime espionage is best under-
stood as a heterogeneous family of intelligence activities which are gener-
ally regulated on the basis of their underlying conduct. Part I also
identifies those specific international laws that are violated by acts of espi-
onage. Part II focuses on the current literature on espionage that contends
that customary espionage exceptions have emerged under CIL. With this
preliminary step achieved, Part III examines whether there is extensive
State practice of espionage which supports the existence of customary espi-
onage exceptions. It shows that while there is at least patchy and anecdo-
tal evidence of extensive State practice of espionage, most of the practice
conducted on the ground is secret, which prevents it from qualifying as
State practice to form CIL. Part IV investigates whether this State practice
is accompanied by opinio juris, and concludes that States have shied away
from defending their intelligence activities under international law.
I. International Law and Peacetime Espionage
'Peacetime espionage' is a colloquial rather than a legal term. It is
used here to describe different methods of collecting confidential informa-
tion from closed as opposed to open sources. 1 6 Information is considered
confidential where the owner possesses a "reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy" 17 over it, such as where a State classifies information as secret under
national law or, in the cyber setting, where an actor encrypts information
or hides it behind a firewall.' 8 In order to constitute espionage, confiden-
15. Id. at 201-02.
16. Chesterman, supra note 4, at 1073 (noting that the collection of information
from open sources-such as newspapers, journals, speeches-does not constitute espio-
nage and is regarded as "legally unproblematic").
17. SIMON CHESTERMAN, ONE NATION UNDER SURVEILLANCE: A NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT
TO DEFEND FREEDOM WITHOUT SACRIFICING LIBERTY 246 (2011).
18. See generally Johann-Christoph Woltag, Coded Communications (Encryption),
OXFORD PUB. INT'L L. (Mar. 2009), http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/
9 7 80199 2 31690/law-9780199231690-e764 (but noting that "under international law
coded communications are only protected explicitly in diplomatic law.").
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tial information must be appropriated without the owner's consent or law-
ful authority.
Peacetime espionage is a practice that is generally conducted by
States, against States. 19 Ordinarily, States perpetrate espionage to acquire
information that reveals the political strategies, economic ambitions and
military capabilities of other States. This is often referred to as political
espionage and this term is used to distinguish it from economic and indus-
trial espionage. 20 While economic and industrial espionage have become
prominent practices within contemporary international society,
2 1 the
focus of this Article is upon the regulation of political espionage.
Regulation of espionage derives from different legal sources. States
invariably adopt national laws the purpose of which are to deter and sup-
press espionage by foreign actors. Almost always, States deploy criminal
law measures to combat political espionage and foreign spies often receive
severe penalties (including capital punishment) upon conviction of espio-
nage. This Article does not undertake a comparative study of domestic
legal frameworks with a view to assessing their application to espionage.
Similarly, how international humanitarian law applies to wartime espio-
nage falls outside of this Article's scope. 22 Instead, this Article is exclu-
sively concerned with how international law regulates peacetime
espionage.
At this point, we should sound a word of caution. It is true that States
have failed to devise either conventional or customary international legal
rules that regulate peacetime espionage.2 3 This does not mean, however,
that espionage is unregulated by international law. In fact, there is a
"checkerboard" of principles of international law as well as specialized
international legal regimes that indirectly regulate peacetime espionage on
the basis of the underlying conduct of States.
2 4
19. McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, supra note 12, at 383 ("Clandestine intelligence
activities are usually associated with nation-states.").
20. See Fidler, supra note 8 ("Economic espionage involves a State's attempts to
acquire covertly trade secrets held by foreign private enterprises," usually with the intent
to relay these trade secrets to domestic companies and thereby strengthen their position
in the marketplace. "[Industrial espionage' describes a company's illegal acquisition of
another company's trade secrets with no government involvement."); Espionage, UK
SECURITY SERVICE: M15 (last visited Jan. 25, 2018) https://www.mi5.gov.uk/targets-of-
espionage [https://perma.cc/MJ55-FSCGI.
21. Karen Sepura, Economic Espionage: The Front Line of a New World Economic War,
26 SYRACUSE J. INr'L L. & COM. 127, 131 (1998). ("[Tlhe question these days ... isn't
which country commits economic espionage, but which doesn't.").
22. On the applicability of international humanitarian law to cyber espionage see,
e.g., G.N. Barrie, Spying-An International Law Perspective, 2008J. S. AFR. L. 238 (2008);
Marco Longobardo, (New) Cyber Exploitation and (Old) International Humanitarian Law
77 ZEITSCHRIFT FoR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHEs RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 809 (2017).
23. See, e.g., Martin Scheinin, Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur
on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Coun-
tering Terrorism, 1 31, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/3, (Feb. 4, 2009) ("[Nit general norm
exists in international law expressly prohibiting or limiting acts of intelligence
gathering.").
24. Forcese, supra note 14, at 209.
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International law does not therefore regulate espionage per se (i.e. the
act of collecting closed information without consent) but, instead, regu-
lates the legality of the conduct that is necessary to operationalize espio-
nage, such as where a State sends its agents into another State to collect
confidential information and in doing so violates that State's sovereignty. 25
In this sense, the legality of intelligence collection is determined by refer-
ence to the actors involved, 26 the type of information pursued 27 and the
international legal context (or locus) within which it operates. 28
The point being made is simple: to contemplate 'is peacetime espio-
nage legal under international law?' is to ask the wrong question. Instead,
what is required is that we subdivide "the world of intelligence collection
into constituent state acts,"'29 which then have to "be subsumed under
established heads of legal terminology, to be assessed, each on its own
merits."'30 It is misconceived to categorize activities as prohibited or not
prohibited, as very few activities are prohibited per se by international
law.31 'Peacetime espionage' is no exception 32 and, as the practice of the
25. See TALLINN MANuAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERA-
TIONS 170 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2017) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL 2.0] ("While the
International Group of Experts agreed that there is no prohibition of espionage per se,
they likewise concurred that cyber espionage may be conducted in a manner that vio-
lates international law due to the fact that certain methods employed to conduct cyber
espionage are unlawful.").
26. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 5(c), Apr. 24, 1963, 21
U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter VCCR]; Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Rela-
tions art. 3(d), Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3327, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 [hereinafter VCDR].
27. See, e.g., VCCR, supra note 26, art. 33; VCDR, supra note 26, art. 24.
28. For example, in another State's territory or in outer space. See Leslie Edmond-
son, Espionage in Transnational Law, 5 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 434, 447 (1972) ("Nations
are reacting to espionage activity on the basis of permissible response to given types of
spying rather than on the basis of the legality or illegality of espionage per se."). States
confirmed this view with the 1960 U-2 incident, when a U.S. surveillance aircraft was
shot down over the Soviet Union. States agreed that the U-2 flight had violated Soviet
territory, and at the same time, a few States expressly recognized that there was no
international law about peacetime espionage. See U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 858th mtg. at
3 &16, U.N. Doc. S/PV.858 (May 24, 1960) (French delegate stated "[tihere are no rules
of international law concerning the gathering of intelligence in peace-time", while
Poland delegate noted that "International law has never concerned itself with peacetime
espionage.").
29. Forcese, supra note 14, at 68.
30. PAl Wrange, Intervention in National and Private Cyberspace and International
Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CHANGING PERCEPTIONS OF SECuRITY: LIBER AMICORUM
SAID MAHMOUDI 307, 321 (Jonas Ebbesson et al. eds., 2014).
31. See BIN CHENG, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 437 (1997) ("Under general
international law, there are in fact few activities of States that are either universally law-
ful or universally unlawful. Most of the time, it depends on where an activity is carried
out. Thus, the answer to the question.., on whether the act of intelligence-gathering [is
legal depends on whether it is] carried out in a States' own territory, in the territory of
another State, [or] the high seas.").
32. There is no functional or juridical reason to lump together different acts of
'peacetime espionage.' States do not possess an international 'right to privacy,' which
would render all acts of intelligence gathering illegal wherever and by whomever com-
mitted. See Navarrete, supra note 10, at 53 ("[li]es Etats n'ont pas de droit A la vie priv~e
en droit international comparable A celui reconnu aux individus par les droits de la
personne.") ["States do not have a right to privacy similar to that of individuals under
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International Court of Justice (ICJ) exemplifies, the legality of espionage is
addressed by focusing upon the underlying conduct and without ever mak-
ing reference to the concept of 'peacetime espionage' itself.3 3
To summarize, the international law about peacetime espionage is best
modeled as the international law about the specific conduct of States when
collecting intelligence. 34 This is important for our analysis of customary
espionage exceptions, as the driving question behind this study is not
whether customary international law has carved out one blanket customary
exception for 'peacetime espionage' generally, but rather whether custom-
ary international law has carved out various exceptions to permit certain
activities of intelligence collection which are otherwise prohibited by inter-
national law on the basis of their underlying conduct.
With these preliminary remarks in mind, we now identify those inter-
national legal rules that prohibit peacetime espionage and for which the
current scholarship has identified customary exceptions. Thus, we do not
provide an exhaustive discussion of how all rules that are potentially impli-
cated by peacetime espionage apply to such conduct (e.g., the principle of
human rights law."] (our translation). See generally LOPOLD PEYREFITTE, DROIT DE
L'ESPACE 274 (1993); Lieutenant Commander Robert E. Coyle, Surveillance From the Seas,
60 MIL. L. REv. 75, 91 (1973) (observing that while "states hold strong wishes that con-
tents of their transmissions remain private, they have no expectation that their transmis-
sions will be private."); J.F. McMahon, Legal Aspects of Outer Space, 38 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
339, 369 (1962) ("IT]here is no international 'right to privacy' which would render
every act of espionage contrary to international law."). But see Paul Reuter, Le droit au
secret des institutions internationales, 2 ANNUAIRE FRANCAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 46
(1956) (discussing the right to secrecy of international organizations). Nor do States
have a general right to property, which could protect all forms of data collected. See also
Peter Tzeng, The States' Right to Property under International Law, 125 Yale LJ. 1805,
1816 (2016).
33. Navarrete, supra note 10, at 16. See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in
and against Nicaragua, supra note 13.
34. On this bottom-up approach to intelligence collection, see Forcese, supra note
14, at 67 (speaking of a 'fourth approach' which "disregards a preoccupation with form
('intelligence collection') and instead examines law governing specific conduct (e.g.,
invasive surveillance, conduct of diplomats, interrogation, and so forth)."); Navarrete,
supra note 10, at 2 (suggesting that "[l]a prise en compte de la pluralite des formes
[d'espionnage en temps de paix] conduit A une image beaucoup plus nuance;
[l'espionnage en temps de paix] est une activite a priori licite, s'autorisant du principe
de libert des ttats, que des rgles hiterog~nes prohibent dans certains cas bien pre-
cis.") ["[1looking at the plurality of existing forms of peacetime espionage allows us to
form a more nuanced view: peacetime espionage is an activity which is a priori lawful on
the basis of the Lotus principle; except in specific cases where the practice under exami-
nation is prohibited by a set of specific and heterogenous legal rules."] (our translation);
Chesterman, supra note 4, at 1127 (Chesterman also appears to favor this approach
when speaking of a normative context which "draws on the various legal regimes that
touch on aspects of intelligence work, but also on the emerging customs and practice of
the intelligence community itself"); Terry, supra note 10, at 179 (Terry also seems to
adopt this approach when he states: "The decisive discussion that needs to be had is
whether the individual actions undertaken by foreign States in order to obtain informa-
tion or influence events are compatible with international law."). This bottom-up
approach is also used by TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 25, at 170 (noting that "[bly
styling a cyber operation as a 'cyber espionage operation,' a State cannot therefore claim
that it is by definition lawful under international law.").
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non-intervention;3 5 international telecommunication laws;36 international
human rights law;3 7 the right of States to conduct arbitration proceedings
or negotiations without interference; 38 immunity of Heads of State, 39 etc.).
Rather, we focus on (a) the principle of territorial sovereignty; (b) the law
of the sea; and (c) diplomatic and consular law.
A. Principle of Territorial Sovereignty
Territorially intrusive forms of espionage violate the principle of terri-
torial sovereignty. This principle is firmly established in international
law 40 and, according to Arbitrator Max Huber in the Island of Palmas
award: "Sovereignty in the relations between States signifies independence.
Independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the right to exercise
therein, to the exclusion of any other State, the functions of a State." 41
Central to the principle of territorial sovereignty is that States possess the
35. See generally Russell Buchan, Cyber Espionage and International Law, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CYBERSPACE 180-86 (Nicholas
Tsagourias & Russell Buchan eds., 2015).
36. See generally International Telecommunication Convention art. 22, Nov. 6, 1982,
1531 U.N.T.S. 319; Ian Waldon, International Telecommunications Law, the Internet and
the Regulation of Cyberspace, in PEACETIME REGIME FOR STATE AcTIvrrIES IN CYBERSPACE:
INTERNATIONAL LAW, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND DIPLOMACY 261-90 (Katharina
Ziolkowski ed., 2013).
37. See generally International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171; David P Fidler, Cyberspace and Human Rights, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK
ON INTERNIATIONAL LAW AND CYBERSPACE 180-86 (Nicholas Tsagourias & Russell Buchan
eds., 2015).
38. See Questions Relating to the Seizure and Detention of Certain Documents and
Data (Timor-Leste v. Austl.), Provisional Measures Order, 2014 I.CJ. 147, ' 27 (Mar. 3);
Navarrete, supra note 10, at 58 (arguing that the ICJ was correct in finding a "plausible
legal right" for Timor-Leste "to conduct arbitration proceedings or negotiations without
interference by Australia, including the right of confidentiality of and non-interference in
its communications with its legal advisers."). But see Stefan Talmon, Determining Cus-
tomary International Law: the ICJ's Methodology Between Induction, Deduction and Asser-
tion, 26 EUR. J. INT'L L. 417, 423 (2016) (criticizing the methodology used by the ICJ to
reach this conclusion).
39. Jovan Kurbalija, E-Diplomacy and Diplomatic Law in the Internet Era, in PEACETIME
REGIME FOR STATE ACTIvITIES IN CYBERSPACE: INTERNATIONAL LAW, INTERNATIONAL RELA-
TIONS AND DIPLOMACY 413 (Katharina Ziolkowski ed., 2013) (observing that "the alleged
surveillance of the Presidents of Brazil, Mexico and others by the NSA could raise the
question of a breach of international customary rules guaranteeing immunities for
Heads of State."). See also, e.g., Is it illegal to spy on Indonesian officials, as president
Susilo Bambino Yudhoyono Claims?, ABC NEws (Dec. 9, 2013), https://www.abc.net.au/
news/20 13-12-03/yudhoyono-goes-too-far-on-legality-o f-spying/5 117318 [https://
perma.cc/6L88-LEKZ].
40. See Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Albania), Merits, 1949 I.CJ. 35 (Apr. 9) (the Court
explained that "[b]etween independent States, respect for territorial sovereignty is an
essential foundation of international relations.").
41. Island of Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 838 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928)
(emphasis added). On the customary status of the principle of territorial sovereignty
see Michael N. Schmitt & Liis Vihul, Respect for Sovereignty in Cyberspace, 95 TEXAs L.
REv. 1639, 1645 (2017). But see Gary P. Corn & Robert Taylor, Online Symposium,
Sovereignty in the Age of Cyber, 111 AM. J. INT'L L. UNBOUND 207, 209-10 (2017) (argu-
ing that the principle of territorial sovereignty is a political norm rather than a legal
rule).
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right to determine entry to and egress from their territory, where State ter-
ritory encompasses its land area, internal waters, 4 2 territorial sea,
4 3
national airspace 4 4 and, most recently, cyber infrastructure that is physi-
cally located within its borders. 4
5
Any non-consensual or unauthorized intrusion into State territory rep-
resents a violation of the principle of territorial sovereignty. As the Perma-
nent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) explained in the Lotus case, the
"first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a State is
that-failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary-it may not
exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State."'4 6 It was for
this reason that in 1986 the ICJ determined that the US's unauthorized use
of (reconnaissance) airplanes violated Nicaragua's sovereignty. 4 7
A growing body of national decisions has steadily recognized that ter-
ritorially intrusive forms of espionage violate the principle of territorial
sovereignty.4 8 In 2008 the Federal Court of Canada refused to grant a war-
rant to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) to conduct espio-
nage activities abroad on the basis that they contravened international
42. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 8, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 23 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
43. Id. art. 3.
44. Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation art. 1, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat.
1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 95, Doc 7300/9 I.C.A.O. 2 ("The contracting states recognize that
every state has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its
territory.").
45. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 25, rule 2.
46. The Case of the S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.IJ. (ser. A) No. 10,
at 18-19 (Sept. 7).
47. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, supra note 13, 1 251
(The ICJ explained that "[tihe principle of the respect for territorial sovereignty is also
directly infringed by the unauthorized overflight of a State's territory by aircraft belong-
ing to or under the control of the government of another State.").
48. The current literature has been mostly oblivious to these national decisions. See
Scheuner, Der Notenwechsel zwischen der Schweiz und Italien in der Angelegenheit Cesare
Rossi, 1 ZETSCHRF FOR AUSLANDISCHE UND OrFFENTLcHE RECHT 280, 283 (1928) (Ger.),
https://goo.gl/Bf9bl5 [https://perma.cc/SDY4-PNX8] (Swiss federal agent Motta stat-
ing that the sending of undercover agents into another State's territory to collect infor-
mation constitutes a violation of international law); Rex v. Rose, [1946] 3 C.Rt 282
(Quebec Court of King's Bench) (stating that since the war of 1914-18, conspiring
against the host State or organizing espionage constitute abuses of office under interna-
tional law), reprinted in 13 ANN. DIG. & REP. PUB. INT'L L. CASEs 161, 164 (H. Lauter-
pacht ed., 1951); In re Flesche, [1949] (Holland, Special Criminal Court, Amsterdam)
(stating that peacetime espionage "when taking place by order of a State, constitutes an
international delinquency by that State against another State for which it is answerable
under international law"), reprinted in 16 ANN. DIG. & REP. PUB. INT'L L. CASES 266, 272
(H. Lauterpacht ed., 1955); Yao Lun, Military Procurator of the Supreme People's
Procuratorate v. Arnold et al., [1954] (Military Tribunal of the Supreme People's Court,
China) (stating that aerial reconnaissance jeopardized China's national security and was
an intrusion into its territorial air space), reprinted in 47 ANN. DIG. & REP. PUB. INT'L L.
CASEs 109, 111 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 1974); Powers case, [1960] (Union of Soviet Social-
ist Republics, Supreme Court) (where the Supreme Court of the USSR considered that
agent Powers violated the USSR's airspace for purposes of espionage), reprinted in 30
INTr'L L. REP. 69, 73-74 (E. Lauterpacht ed., 1966).
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law. 49 In refusing to issue this warrant, the Federal Court observed that
the intrusive activities contemplated would "clearly impinge upon the ...
principles of territorial sovereign equality and non-intervention and are
likely to violate the laws of the jurisdiction where the investigative activities
are to occur."50 In light of the above, it can be concluded that, "[iun times
of peace ... espionage and, in fact, any penetration of the territory of a
state by agents of another state in violation of the local law is also a viola-
tion of the rule of international law imposing a duty upon States to respect
the territorial integrity and political independence of other States."'' z
This conclusion should be tempered in the case of cyber espionage as
States are still debating the precise remit of the principle of territorial sov-
ereignty in cyberspace. In this respect, there was agreement among the
International Group of Experts responsible for compiling the influential
Tallinn Manual 2.0 that cyber operations violate a State's territorial sover-
eignty where they produce real-world physical damage (such as death or
injury to people or damage to physical property)5 2 or give rise to destruc-
tive effects in cyberspace (such as affecting the availability or functionality
of computer systems).5 3 According to this view, because cyber espionage
only involves the copying of confidential information it does not trigger a
violation of the territorial sovereignty principle.5 4 This being said, there is
another school of thought that contends that any cyber operation (includ-
49. Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act (Re) (F.C.), 2008 F.C. 230, [2008] 4
F.C.R. 230.
50. Id. at paras. 49-55; see also X(Re), 2013 F.C. 1275, para. 105, [20151 1 F.C.R
635, para. 105.
51. Quincy Wright, Espionage and the Doctrine of Non-Intervention in Internal Affairs,
in ESSAYS ON ESPIONAGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 3, 12 (Roland J. Stanger ed., 1962). See
also JOHN KISH INTERNATIONAL LAw AND ESPIONAGE 84 (David Turns ed., 1995) ("[The
principle of territorial integrity] negates the general permissibility of strategic observa-
tion in foreign territory."); Manuel R. Garcia-Mora, Treason, Sedition, and Espionage as
Political Offenses under the Law of Extradition, 26 U. PIr L. REv. 65, 79-80 (1964)
("Though international law does not explicitly condemn wartime espionage, peacetime
espionage is regarded as an international delinquency and a violation of international
law."); Andrey L. Kozik, The Concept of Sovereignty as a Foundation for Determining the
Legality of the Conduct of States in Cyberspace, 14 BALIC Y.B. INT'L L. 93, 99 (2014)
("[S]ending spies into the territory of another State would be a violation of the territorial
sovereignty rule"); Frederick Alexander Mann, The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in Interna-
tional Law, 111 COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INT'L L. 1, 139 (1964)
("[A State may not] send its police officers, even if they are in civilian clothes, into for-
eign States to investigate crimes or make enquiries affecting investigations in their own
country. Nor can it allow spies or informers to operate abroad.").
52. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 25, at 20 ("To the extent that non-consensual
physical presence on another State's territory to conduct cyber operations amounts to a
violation of sovereignty, the Experts concurred that the causation of physical conse-
quences by remote means on that territory likewise constitutes a violation of
sovereignty.").
53. Id. at 20-21 ("[T]he Experts agreed that, in addition to physical damage, the
remote causation of loss of functionality of cyber infrastructure located in another State
sometimes constitutes a violation of sovereignty, although no consensus could be
achieved as to the precise threshold at which this is so due to a lack of opinio juris in this
regard.").
54. Id. at 171 ("The majority of the Experts was of the view that exfiltration violates
no international law prohibition irrespective of the attendant severity.").
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ing espionage) that intrudes upon a State's cyber infrastructure without
consent or authorization contravenes the principle of territorial sover-
eignty, regardless of whether additional damage or harm is caused.55 The
reaction of a number of States to the Snowden revelations supports this
latter, broader view but State practice in this area is embryonic and even
contradictory. 56
Not all forms of espionage are territorially intrusive and hence cap-
tured by the principle of territorial sovereignty. Technological develop-
ments have enabled States to spy without having to physically penetrate
each other's territory. States can therefore conduct espionage passively
(e.g., by using listening posts within their own territory or upon the high
seas to capture electronic signals emanating from the territory of other
States) or peripherally (e.g., by using satellites or drones in outer space to
observe events occurring within another State's territory).
There is a related point. As well as protecting their physical territory,
the principle of territorial sovereignty also protects the right of States to
perform governmental functions (so called 'enforcement jurisdiction')
within their territory to the exclusion of all others.57 This means that the
principle of territorial sovereignty can be violated even in the absence of a
physical intrusion into State territory-the question is whether the act
under examination "interferes with or usurps the inherently governmental
functions of another State."' 58 With regard to espionage, State practice
indicates that conduct that deprives a State of its confidentiality over infor-
mation does not in and by itself amount to interference in or usurpation of
a State's sovereignty. For example, the use of satellites to conduct remote
sensing is widely regarded as compliant with international law,59 as are the
use of listening posts stationed within a State's territory to passively cap-
55. See Wrange, supra note 30, at 322 ("[E]spionage that involves unauthorized
access to servers and other computers in a foreign state generally constitute illegal inter-
ventions into the sovereignty of that state.").
56. See Jeremy Wright, UK Attorney General, Speech Delivered at Chatham House,
London, Cyber and International Law in the 21st Century (May, 23 2018) (explaining the
United Kingdom's position on applying international law to cyberspace and stating:
"Some have sought to argue for the existence of a cyber specific rule of a 'violation of
territorial sovereignty' in relation to interference in the computer networks of another
state without its consent. Sovereignty is of course fundamental to the international
rules-based system. But I am not persuaded that we can currently extrapolate from that
general principle a specific rule or additional prohibition for cyber activity beyond that
of a prohibited intervention. The UK Government's position is therefore that there is no
such rule as a matter of current international law."). For a discussion of this State prac-
tice see infra Table 1. See also BucHAN, supra note 10, chapter 3.
57. See Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Territorial Sovereignty and Neutrality in Cyber-
space, 89 INr'L L. STUD. 123, 124 (2013) (explaining that the principle of territorial sov-
ereignty means that "the State alone is entitled to exercise jurisdiction, especially by
subjecting objects and persons within its territory to domestic legislation and to enforce
these rules. Moreover, the State is entitled to control access to and egress from its
territory.").
58. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 25, at 21; Navarrete, supra note 10, at 31. See
also R. v. Hape, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 292 (Can.).
59. See Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space, G.A. Res.
41/65, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/64 (1986). See generally Harry
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ture electronic signals emanating from the territory of another State.60
B. Law of the Sea
Peacetime espionage may also run into conflict with the rules of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). 6 1 UNCLOS
delineates the legal framework applicable to the sea and determines who
exercises jurisdiction over this environment and how activities must be
conducted within it more generally. 62 For the purpose of this Article, it
suffices to say that every State has the right to establish the breadth of its
territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles from its base-
line,6 3 which is usually the low-water line of the State's coast.6 4
To facilitate global navigation, States are entitled to innocent passage
through the territorial sea of other States. Article 19 UNCLOS provides
that "[plassage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good
order or security of the coastal State" and proceeds to give examples of
conduct that can be regarded as prejudicial. 6 5 In particular, Article
19(2)(c) explains that passage is non-innocent where it involves "any act
aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defence or security
of the coastal State." 6 6 Article 19(2)(c) is cast in broad terms and encom-
passes different forms of information collection including the acquisition
of information from closed sources, that is, espionage.6 7 Indeed, State
practice subsequent to UNCLOS's adoption demonstrates that States
regard the presence of vessels in their territorial sea for espionage purposes
as non-innocent and have protested and objected in such instances. 68
Beyond the territorial sea exists the high sea. Enshrined within
UNCLOS is the principle of the freedom of the high seas,6 9 which recog-
nizes the right of all nations to freedom of navigation and overflight. The
corollary of this principle is that UNCLOS does not prohibit States from
Feder, The Sky's the Limit? Evaluating the International law of Remote Sensing, 23 NYU J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 599 (1991).
60. Weber and Saravia v. Germany, App. No. 54934/00, 2006-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 309,
344; Navarrete, supra note 10, at 21.
61. UNCLOS, supra note 42, art. 19.
62. See generally id.
63. Id. art. 3.
64. Id. art. 5
65. Id. art. 19.
66. Id.
67. SeeJames Kraska, Putting Your Head in the Tiger's Mouth: Submarine Espionage in
Territorial Waters, 54 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 164, 219 (2015) ("[T]he proscription
against 'any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defense or secur-
ity of the coastal State,' quite plainly makes intelligence gathering inherently not inno-
cent"); See also Michael N. Schmitt, Peacetime Cyber Responses and Wartime Cyber
Operations Under International Law: An Analytical Vade Mecum, 8 HI-Rv. NAT'L SECUrITY
J. 239 (noting that "[a]lthough espionage is not unlawful per se, engaging in it during
innocent passage is an internationally wrongful act.").
68. For a discussion of this practice see id. at 212 et seq.
69. UNCLOS, supra note 42, art. 87.
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engaging in espionage while on the high seas.70 Such conduct is, however,
residually regulated by general principles of international law.
C. Diplomatic and Consular Law
Finally, peacetime espionage may also violate the Vienna Convention
on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR) and the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations (VCCR). These conventions prohibit receiving States from com-
mitting espionage against the diplomatic and consular missions of sending
States.7 1 This legal framework imposes a triple lock of protection to this
effect.
First, diplomatic and consular premises are "inviolable" and can only
be entered with the consent of the head of mission.7 2 Diplomatic and con-
sular premises include the buildings or parts of buildings and the land
ancillary thereto (irrespective of ownership) that is used for the purposes
of the mission.73 Premises also include cyber infrastructure located upon
their territory, which extends to computer networks and systems sup-
ported by that cyber infrastructure. 7 4 Any intrusion into these premises-
including for the purpose of espionage-is prohibited.
75
Second, archives and documents of diplomatic and consular missions
are inviolable at all times and wherever they may be. 76 In this context,
'archives and documents' are defined broadly to include "all the papers,
documents correspondence, books, films, tapes and registers of the consu-
lar post, together with the ciphers and codes, the card-indexes and any
article of furniture intended for their protection or safekeeping." 7 7 Cer-
tainly, it is prohibited to commit acts of espionage against the archives and
documents of diplomatic and consular missions.
70. See Petros Liacouras, Intelligence gathering on the High Seas, in UNRESOLVED ISSUES
AND NEw CHALLENGES TO THE LAw OF THE SEA: TIME BEFORE AND TIME AFTER 121, 134
(Anastasia Strati, Maria Gavouneli & Nikolaos Skourtos eds., 2006) ("[I]ntelligence
gathering on vessels sailing in international waters is permitted in principle."); Oliver J.
Lissitzyn, Electronic Reconnaissance from the High Seas and International Law, 61 INT'L L.
STUn. 563, 569 ("[Ilnternational law does not forbid electronic reconnaissance from the
high seas."); Chesterman, supra note 4, at 1082-83.
71. VCDR, supra note 26, art. 21; VCCR, supra note 26, art. 31. While the VCDR and
the VCCR prohibit diplomatic and consular posts from engaging in espionage, these
conventions confer upon diplomatic and consular officials immunity from the criminal
jurisdiction of the receiving state. See VCDR, supra note 26, art. 31(1) and VCCR, supra
note 26, art. 41(1). This is significant because acts of espionage committed by diplo-
matic and consular officials almost certainly violate the national criminal law of the
receiving state, as all states criminalize espionage. However, even if diplomatic and con-
sular officials can invoke immunity in relation to criminal acts of espionage, the sending
state is nevertheless responsible for violations of diplomatic and consular law commit-
ted by its diplomatic and consular officials and thus the question of whether customary
espionage exceptions exist.in relation to those prohibitive rules remains apposite.
72. VCDR, supra note 26, art. 21; VCCR, supra note 26, art. 31.
73. VCDR, supra note 26, art. 1(i); VCCR, supra note 26, art. 1, '1 I(j).
74. TALLINN MANuAL 2.0, supra note 25, at 212.
75. See Ren Vark, Diplomatic and Consular Privileges and Immunities in Case of
Unfriendly Cyber Activities, 14 BALTIc Y.B. INT'L L. 125, 130 (2014).
76. VCDR, supra note 26, art. 24; VCCR, supra note 26, art. 33.
77. VCCR, supra note 26, art. 1, 1 1(k).
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Third, in addition to the inviolability of archives and documents, dip-
lomatic and consular law provides that "official correspondence" belong-
ing to diplomatic and consular missions is "inviolable. '78 The objective of
this provision is to guarantee the secrecy between diplomatic and consular
missions and their sending State and in doing so buttress the legal protec-
tion afforded to these missions against espionage.
Diplomatic and consular law proscribes diplomatic and consular mis-
sions from being used as a platform for espionage. First, diplomatic and
consular law imposes a duty upon staff to respect the laws and regulations
of the receiving State.79 Given that most States adopt national laws that
prohibit espionage, diplomatic and consular staff that engage in espionage
will violate local law and thus the sending State will violate its treaty obli-
gation. Second, diplomatic staff "have a duty not to interfere in the inter-
nal affairs of that [the receiving] State." 80 For the purpose of this
provision, considerable State practice has affirmed that acts of espionage-
regardless of whether this conduct physically intrudes upon State territory
or is conducted passively- constitute interference in a State's internal
affairs.81 Third, the premises of diplomatic and consular missions cannot
be used in any manner incompatible with the functions of the mission. 82
Undoubtedly, diplomatic and consular missions are permitted to collect
information while operating within the territory of a receiving State. 83 Yet,
they can only collect information by 'all lawful means.' 'Lawful means'
includes those measures that are acceptable under the domestic law of the
receiving State. Given that espionage is likely to violate the domestic law of
most States, espionage represents an "abuse of ... function" 84 and, on this
basis, cannot be regarded as a lawful means through which diplomatic and
consular missions can collect information. 85
II. Customary Exceptions and Peacetime Espionage
Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice 1945
refers to "international custom" as a source of international law, which it
defines as a "general practice accepted as law."86 The jurisprudence of the
78. VCDR, supra note 26, art. 27, c1 2; VCCR, supra note 26, art. 35, 1 2.
79. VCDR, supra note 26, art. 41, 11 1; VCCR, supra note 26, art. 55, 1 1.
80. VCCR, supra note 26, art. 55, cl 1.
81. E.g., U.S. Dep't of State, Expulsions of Soviets Worldwide, 1986, Foreign Affairs
Note, 4 (Jan. 1987) (In 1985 Liberia expelled the entire Soviet diplomatic mission for
acts of espionage that it considered amounted to "'gross interference' in Liberian inter-
nal affairs.").
82. VCDR, supra note 26, art. 41, l 3; VCCR, supra note 26, art. 55, 1 2.
83. VCDR, supra note 26, art. 3, Cl d; VCCR, supra note 26, art. 5, Cl c.
84. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Judgment,
1980 I.CJ. 3, cl 84 (May 24); Ingrid Delupis, Foreign Warships and Immunity for Espio-
nage, 78 AM. J. INr'L L. 53, 69 (1984) ("[D]iplomats commit acts contrary to interna-
tional law if they gather secret information.").
85. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 25, at 229.
86. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, cl l(b), 59
Stat. 1055.
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ICJ8 7 and the work of the International Law Commission (ILC) 8 8 confirm
that two elements must be established for CIL to form. First, State practice
of the rule in question; and second, the requirement that this practice is
accepted by States as law (opinio juris). This methodology for the identifi-
cation of CIL is known as the "two-element approach" 8 9 and requires, au
fond, an arithmetical exercise of counting State practice coupled with
opinio juris to determine whether a certain practice has attracted sufficient
support between States for it to be regarded as communally accepted and
thus binding CIL. This methodology applies to the identification of 'cus-
tomary exceptions.' 90
It can be preliminarily concluded from the previous section that espio-
nage contravenes a number of primary norms of international law. While
scholars have been prepared-facially-to accept that espionage runs into
conflict with these rules, they invariably assert the thesis that, because
espionage is so widespread within the world order, CIL permits such con-
duct.9 ' In essence, these scholars argue that "[y]ears of state practice" of
espionage has given rise to a permissive rule or rules of CIL in favor of the
legality of such conduct. 9 2 Scholars have articulated this claim in two dif-
ferent ways, which must be distinguished.
One group of scholars has asserted that CIL embraces what we term a
blanket espionage exception. The gist of this approach is that "because espi-
onage is such a fixture in international affairs it is fair to say that the prac-
tice of states recognizes espionage as a legitimate function of the state, and
therefore it is legal as a matter of customary international law."'9 3 This
blanket exception is rooted not so much in an assessment of the full empir-
ical record of State practice and opinio juris for each form of spying, but on
the idea that "intelligence activities [as whole] are now accepted as a com-
mon, even inherent, attribute of the modern state."
94
87. E.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, supra note 13,
'1 207 ("[F]or a new customary rule to be formed, not only must the acts concerned
Iamount to a settled practice,' but they must be accompanied by the opinio juris sive
necessitatis."); Continental Shelf (Libya Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, 1985 I.CJ.
13, 1 27 (June 3) ("It is of course axiomatic that the material of customary international
law is to be looked for primarily in the actual practice and opinio juris of States.").
88. See Int'l Law Comm'n, Report of the International Law Commission: Seventieth
Session, U.N. Doc. A/73/10, at 124 (2018) ("To determine the existence and content of a
rule of customary international law, it is necessary to ascertain whether there is a gen-
eral practice that is accepted as law (opinio juris)").
89. See Michael Wood (Special Rapporteur), Second Rep. on Identification of Custom-
ary International Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/672, 21 (2014).
90. See id. We elaborate more on this two-element approach in Part IV below.
91. See supra note 12.
92. Brown & Poellet, supra note 10, at 134 ("Years of state practice accepting viola-
tions of territorial sovereignty for the purpose of espionage have apparently led to the
establishment of an exception to traditional rules of sovereignty-a new norm seems to
have been created.").
93. Jeffrey H. Smith, State Intelligence Gathering and International Law, 28 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 543, 544 (2007).
94. Geoffrey B. Demarest, Espionage in International Law, 24 DENv. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 321, 321 (1996). See also KISH, supra note 51, at xv (observing that espionage has
become an "established international function of States . .. [and] Governments have
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However, this all-encompassing approach is methodologically flawed.
As we have seen, 'peacetime espionage' is not an operative legal concept.
Different forms of espionage engage different international legal rules.
Another group of scholars has therefore correctly observed that when
determining whether CIL contains a right to spy, what is required is an
assessment of State practice with regard to the specific international legal
rule that it contravenes.
Building on the above, these scholars have maintained that territori-
ally intrusive acts of espionage (e.g., that violate the principle of territorial
sovereignty or UNCLOS) benefit from a customary exception because
"states have practiced territorially intrusive intelligence collection by air,
sea, and on land, through a variety of means, from time immemorial.19 5
With regard to remotely launched acts of cyber espionage, the claim is that
such conduct is akin to territorially intrusive acts of espionage and thus-
by extension-benefits from the same customary exception. 96 Others have
gone further and argued that State practice of remotely launched cyber
espionage operations is-in and of itself-"so thick, and the condemnation
on the basis of international law so muted, '9 7 that customary international
law regards such conduct as lawful.
Other scholars have further claimed that a customary exception has
emerged which permits States to listen to communications to, from and
within diplomatic and consular premises, this being conduct that is prima
facie in violation of the VCDR and VCCR. Deeks, for instance, considers
that in light of the extensive practice of violating the VCDR, and the fact
that States did not explicitly address spying in this treaty despite it being
so widespread, "it would be a notable change to interpret the VCDR to pro-
hibit such activities."'98 Similarly, Reisman and Freedman note that States
that "engage in such conduct must conclude, and presumably have con-
cluded, that the need for and value of intelligence gained by electronic sur-
veillance outweighs the incremental erosion of the norm upholding the
publicly admitted the existence of their intelligence services and systematic espionage
operations"); THOMAS C. WINGFIELD, THE LAW OF INFORMATION CONFLICT: NATIONAL
SECURITY LAW IN CYBERSPACE 350 (2000) ("[T]he practice of states has specifically recog-
nized a right to engage in such clandestine intelligence collection activities as an inher-
ent part of foreign relations and policy."); Kilovaty, supra note 6, at 60 (noting that
"peacetime espionage is inherent to the function of a state, and it has been used mas-
sively throughout history").
95. Roger D. Scott, Territorially Intrusive Intelligence Collection and International
Law, 46 A.F. L. REV. 217, 226 (1999). See also supra note 22.
96. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 25, at 171 ("A few of the Experts took the
view that this activity would not be unlawful, suggesting that acts of espionage represent
an exception to the prohibitions of violation of sovereignty (Rule 4) and intervention
(Rule 66).").
97. Michael N. Schmitt, Cyber Response "By The Numbers" in International Law, EJIL:
Talk! (Aug. 4, 2015), https://goo.gl/YwiHgx fhttps://perma.cc/59B7-JVM6].
98. Deeks, supra note 6, at 255; see also Deeks, supra note 10, at 313 (arguing that
"[t]he same analysis could apply to the question of spying by the sending state using the
mission as a base: It is so widespread that it is inappropriate to interpret VCDR Art. 41
as prohibiting such activity.").
Cornell International Law Journal
inviolability of diplomatic premises and their communications."9 9 The Tal-
linn Manual 2.0 notes that "a few" of its Experts were of the view that
diplomatic and consular missions can be used to engage in cyber espio-
nage against third party States "because long-standing allegations of State
practice" points to the permissibility of such practice. 10 0
To summarize, international legal scholarship has claimed specific
customary exceptions for the following conduct:
1. Non-consensual or unauthorized intrusions by (a) undercover agents on
the ground (without diplomatic or consular character), (b) ships, (c)
submarines, and (d) planes into the territory of another State to collect
confidential information in violation of the principle of territorial sover-
eignty, the Chicago Convention 1944 or UNCLOS 1982.
2. Non-innocent passage by a ship or submarine into the territorial sea of
another State to collect confidential information in violation of Article
19(2)(c) UNCLOS 1982, and parallel principles of customary intema-
tional law.
3. Spying from diplomatic and consular premises in violation of VCDR
1961 and VCCR 1963, and parallel principles of customary interna-
tional law.
4. Spying on diplomatic and consular premises, archives, documents or
official correspondence in violation of the VCDR 1961 and VCCR 1963,
and parallel principles of customary international law.
5. Non-consensual or unauthorized remote access cyber intrusions into the
networks and systems of another State to collect confidential informa-
tion, possibly in violation of the principle of territorial sovereignty.
For each of these customary exceptions, the obligation is upon the State
asserting a right under CIL to prove that there is sufficient State practice
accompanied by opinio juris to support its existence. 1 1 We now turn to
these two elements holistically for each form of spying.
III. State Practice
State practice is the objective or material element of CIL and it can
take the form of acts or omissions. 10 2 State practice comprises physical
and verbal conduct undertaken by the legislature, executive or judiciary
and includes but is not limited to:' 0 3 physical conduct of States 'on the
ground,' diplomatic correspondence, policy statements, press releases,
opinions of government legal advisers, official manuals on legal questions
(e.g., military manuals), executive decisions and practices, orders to mili-
tary forces, comments by governments on ILC drafts and corresponding
commentaries, legislation, international and national judicial decisions,
99. W. Michael Reisman & Eric E. Freedman, The Plaintiffs Dilemma: Illegally
Obtained Evidence and Admissibility in International Adjudication, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 737,
752 (1983).
100. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 25, at 229.
101. See Colombian-Peruvian Asylum Case (Colom. v. Peru), Judgment, 1950 I.CJ.
266, 276-77 (Nov. 20).
102. See Case of the S.S. Lotus, supra note 46, at 28. Aspects of this section are drawn
from BucwtAN, supra note 10, chapter 7.
103. See Wood, supra note 89, 1 37.
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recitals in treaties and other international instruments (especially when in
'all States' form), extensive patterns of treaties in the same terms, practice
of international organs, and resolutions relating to legal questions in UN
organs, notably the General Assembly. 10 4
State practice contains several distinct features. As the ICJ stipulates,
State practice must be of a certain (a) duration and (b) generality and uni-
formity to establish this element of CIL.' 0 5 This Article argues (c) that
another element must also be present, namely, that State practice must be
of a public character. This is significant in the case of peacetime espionage.
A. Duration
The traditional view is that it is inherent to the notion of customary
international law that time must pass in order for a norm to transition into
a binding rule; said otherwise, the State practice attendant to the putative
rule must extend over a period of time. 1 0 6 Writing in 1961, Hart explained
that customary law forms after a "slow process of growth, whereby courses
of conduct once thought optional become first habitual or usual, then obli-
gatory, and the converse process of decay, when deviations, once severely
dealt with, are first tolerated and then pass unnoticed." 10 7 Yet, the modern
formulation of the doctrine of customary international law has come to
accept that customary rules can develop instantaneously.10 8 For example,
in the 1996 Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion the ICJ appeared sympa-
thetic to the view that CIL can form where States vote overwhelmingly in
favor of a General Assembly resolution that endorses or denounces a par-
ticular activity, 10 9 providing of course that this surge in State practice is
accompanied by the belief that it is accepted as law. Consequently, the
elements of generality, uniformity and public character are more important
to the constitution of state practice than duration.
There is no doubt that most forms of espionage have a long history in
international relations and according to one commentator "[e]spionage has
existed since the dawn of human history."' 1 0 Indeed, there are references
to espionage in the Bible"'I and in the works of scholars writing in ancient
Greece" 12 and ancient China. 113 More to the point, States have performed
104. Report of the International Law Commission: Seventieth Session, supra note 88,
Conclusion 6(2).
105. See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Ger. v. Den.; Federal
Republic of Ger. v. Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.CJ. 4, 1 73 (Feb. 20).
106. See Robert Jennings, Customary Law and General Principles of Law as Sources of
Space Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS OF ACTIVITIES IN OUTER SPACE: STATE OF THE LAW
AND MEASURES OF PROTECTION (Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel ed., 1988).
107. HERBERT L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 92 (1961).
108. See CHIENG, supra note 31, at 147.
109. See Legality of the Threat or use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.CJ. 226, 1 70 (July 8).
110. Ziolkowski, supra note 10, at 425. See also Scott, supra note 95, at 218
("[E]spionage has been practised by the nations of the world for centuries.").
111. See Joshua 2:1.
112. SeeJ. A. Richmond, Spies in Ancient Greece, 45 GREECE AND ROME 1, 1 (1998).
113. See Sun Tzu, THE ART OF WAR 144 (1981).
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acts of espionage in violation of the principle of territorial sovereignty
since this principle's inception at the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and this
practice has continued unabated into the contemporary era. 1 14 Similarly,
the use of vessels for espionage purposes within the territorial sea of other
States has been a common feature of international relations since the adop-
tion of UNCLOS in 1982.115 Also, States have conducted espionage
against and from within diplomatic and consular missions for many centu-
ries and especially since the codification of diplomatic and consular law in
the 1961 VCDR and the 1963 VCCR.
116
B. Generality and Uniformity
Next, acts of peacetime espionage must be of a certain generality and
uniformity. 1 1 7 Given their overlap, the requirements of generality and uni-
formity can be considered together. 18 Generality contains two constituent
elements. First, a precondition for the development of CIL is that State
practice is "widespread"'1 9 within the international society. International
law does not prescribe a specific number (or percentile) of States that must
engage in an activity for it to be regarded as widespread. This being said, it
is clear that a putative rule "need not pass the test of universal acceptance"
for it be classified as CIL. 12° What is decisive is whether "[tihe practice
must have been applied by the overwhelming majority of states which hith-
erto had an opportunity of applying it"'12 1 and that "[tihe available prac-
tice . . . [will be] so widespread that any remaining inconsistent practice
will be marginal and without direct legal effect."'12 2 Thus, in the North Sea
114. See U.N. SCOR 858th mtg., supra note 28, at 12 (As China stated, espionage "has
been practised from the beginning of organized society.").
115. See JAMES KRAsKA, MARITIME POWER AND THE LAW OF THE SEA: EXPEDITIONARY OPER-
ATIONS IN WORLD POLITICs 270-71 (2011); See also James Kraska, Putting Your Head in
the Tiger's Mouth: Submarine Espionage in Territorial Waters, 54 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
164, 164 (2015).
116. See Victor Colonieu, L'Espionnage au point de vue du droit international et
p~nal fran-ais [Espionage Under International Law and French Criminal Law] (our
translation) (Dec. 27, 1888) (Doctoral Thesis, Lyon Faculty of Law, Paris, Librairie Nou-
velle de Droit et de Jurisprudence), at 137 (observing as early as 1888 that diplomatic
espionage was commonplace) (Fr.).
117. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, supra note 105, c 73. Article 38(1)(b) of the
ICJ Statute also expressly defines CIL as a "general" practice accepted as law.
118. See David P. Fidler, Challenging the Classical Concept of Custom: Perspectives on
the Future of Customary International Law, 39 GEMANr Y.B. INT'L L. 198, 202 (1996)
(explaining, these requirements "meld together in a unitary analytical process. Interna-
tional lawyers cannot, for example, analyse whether State practice is general without
having identified a practice that is uniform.").
119. Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain
(Qatar v. Bahr.), Judgment, 2001 I.CJ. 40, 1 205 (Mar. 16); North Sea Continental Shelf
Cases, supra note 105, cl 73.
120. See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, supra 105, at 229 (Dissenting Opinion of
Judge Lachs).
121. Josef L. Kunz, The Nature of Customary International Law, 47 Am.J. INT'L L. 662,
666 (1953).
122. MARK E. VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES: A MANUAL ON
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERRELATION OF SOuRCES 30 (2d ed. 1997).
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Continental Shelf Cases the ICJ rejected the existence of a customary rule on
the basis that there were only 15 examples of State practice in support of
the rule, which it said represented "a very small proportion . . . [of] the
world as a whole."' 123 Second, even where a State practice is widespread
within the international society, it must also be "representative" 12 4 of its
members for CIL to crystalize; "namely that States with different political,
economic and legal systems, [and] States of all continents, [must] partici-
pate in the process."' 25
Uniformity requires States to formulate their claims to customary law
in a manner that is materially analogous. This does not mean that "in the
practice of States the application of the rules in question should have been
perfect";12 6 indeed, the ICJ has stressed "too much importance need not be
attached to the few uncertainties or contradictions in state practice."1 2 7
Rather, what is important is that State practice is "consistent"'128 and "con-
cordant"1 29 with the putative rule.
The inherently secretive nature of espionage makes it difficult to deter-
mine whether State practice of territorially intrusive forms of espionage
satisfies the requirements of generality and uniformity. 130 However, the
available evidence certainly points to this conclusion. Indeed, one com-
mentator explains that there is a "tidal wave"'13 1 of State practice in favor of
these forms of espionage. This claim is supported by the fact that States
have on various occasions admitted that espionage is an integral feature of
their relations. For example, in a Security Council meeting that was con-
vened to discuss the legality of the US's use of spy planes within the territo-
rial airspace of the USSR, Poland explained that "such activities are
123. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, supra note 105, ' 75.
124. Id. '1 73.
125. Id. at 227 (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Lachs).
126. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, supra note 13, c
186.
127. Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.CJ. 116, 138 (Dec. 18).
128. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, supra note 13, 11
186.
129. Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), Judgment, 1974 I.CJ. 3, 1 16 (July 25). As
an illustration, in the Newfoundland case the Supreme Court of Canada had to determine
whether, by 1949, customary international law recognized that States possessed a sover-
eign right to explore and exploit the natural resources located in the continental shelf
adjacent to their coastline. The Supreme Court identified approximately 15 examples of
States claiming such a right. However, the Court was unable to conclude that this right
had crystallized as customary law because the available State practice was not suffi-
ciently large and, more importantly in the context of the present discussion, these
claims were "far from uniform." For the Court, what was problematic was that while
these States claimed a sovereign right to explore and exploit in the continental shelf, they
differed as to the scope and depth to which this right extended. In the words of the
Court, "[a] majority claimed not only the continental shelf, but also the superjacent
waters. Some States claimed the geographic shelf to a limited depth; others claimed a
limit of 200 miles from the coast, whatever the depth." In re Newfoundland Continental
Shelf, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 86, 119 (Can.).
130. See Brown & Poellet, supra note 10, at 133 ("Despite the 'ungentlemanly' nature
of espionage, it is an open secret that countries spy on friends and foes alike.").
131. Scott, supra note 95, at 221.
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unfortunately the normal practice. Is there any country which is not
involved and which would be entitled to cast the first stone?"'13
2 At the
same meeting, China explained that "[e]spionage is not a new phenome-
non; nor is it a rare phenomenon." 133
While on the topic of spy planes that operate within the territorial
airspace of other States, in the Nicaragua case Nicaragua accused the
United States of violating its airspace on more than 900 occasions.
134 Sim-
ilarly, in 1995 Libya officially complained before the Security Council that
between 1975 and 1980 its airspace was exploited for the purpose of espio-
nage over 150 times. 135 With regard to spying within the territorial sea,
the case of Sweden stands out because it was reported that foreign subma-
rines violated its territorial waters on at least 93 occasions between 1962
and 1980.136
In the cyber context, the Snowden leaks revealed that the United States
and a number of other States had been engaged in a massive global cyber
espionage campaign against various State and non-State actors. 13 7 It is tell-
ing that former French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner admitted that
he was shocked by the international furor caused by the leaks, explaining
"let's be honest, we [France] eavesdrop too. Everyone is listening to every-
one else."' 13 8 Also, in response to the Snowden leaks, President Obama
explained: "Now let me be clear: our intelligence agencies will continue to
gather information about the intentions of governments-as opposed to
ordinary citizens-around the world, in the same way that the intelligence
services of every other nation does."'
13 9
132. U.N. SCOR 858th mtg., supra note 28, at 2.
133. Id. at 12.
134. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
Memorial of Nicaragua, 1986 L.CJ. Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Docs. 1V, 31, 1 120 (Apr.
30) ("[s]uch overflights have been conducted on a regular basis. During the preceding
10 months of 1984 alone, 996 overflights took place.").
135. See Letter Dated Aug. 1, 1980 from the interim Charge d'Affaires of the Perma-
nent Mission of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the United Nations Addressed to the
President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/14094 Annex, at 3-4 (Aug. 6, 1980)
(speaking of numerous "airspace violations and American terror and spying missions");
see also Address by the H.E. General Michel Aoun, President of the Republic of Lebanon,
at the 72d session of the UN General Assembly (Sept. 21, 2017), available at https://
goo.gl/ob2dyY [https://perma.cc/2UV9-7HS2] (condemning Israel for espionage and
.at least 100 land, sea and air, violations to the Lebanese sovereignty each and every
month.").
136. See Roma Sadurska, Foreign Submarines in Swedish Waters: The Erosion of an
International Norm, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 34, 35 (1984).
137. See generally Ed Pilkington, Time Berners-Lee: Spies' Cracking of Encryption
Undermines the Web, THE GuARDIAN (Dec. 2, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/tech-
nology/ 2 013/dec/03/tim-berners-lee-spies-cracking-encryption-web-snowden [https://
perma.cc/CM7U-BTYF] (providing an overview of the Snowden revelations).
138. Brett LoGiurato, Former French Foreign Minister Nails it on the Outrage over US
Spying on Foreign Leaders, BuSINESS INSIDER (Oct. 24, 2013), https://www
.businessinsider.com/nsa-spying-outrage-merkel-germany-obama-francehollande-2013-
10?IR=T [https://perma.cc/FN3T-YVRV].
139. Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Review of Signals Intelligence (Jan.
17, 2014) (emphasis added).
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With specific regard to espionage against and from within diplomatic
and consular missions, one document disclosed by Snowden listed 38 dip-
lomatic missions and consular posts that the United States had identified
as targets for espionage. 140 These reports were followed in October 2013
by allegations that Australian diplomatic and consular missions in Bang-
kok, Beijing, Dili, Hanoi, Kuala Lumpur and Port Moresby were engaged in
cyber espionage activities. 141 In defense of these allegations, Australian
Prime Minister Tony Abbott explained that "every government gathers
information and... every government knows that every other government
gathers information". 142 All in all, "[r]ecent news reports are rife with
descriptions of spying conducted from within diplomatic posts."'1 43
C. Public Character
So far, we have demonstrated that there is, at the very least, patchy and
anecdotal evidence of extensive State practice of different forms of espio-
nage in violation of different international law rules. But the fact remains
that, because of its inherent nature, spying is a secret State practice. This is
problematic in the context of custom because, as we will see, State practice
must be public in character to inform the development of CIL.
International tribunals have recognized the difficulty of identifying
CIL when State practice is conducted secretly. In the Tadie case, the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) sounded a
word of caution regarding the identification of CIL in the context of armed
conflict: 14 4
When attempting to ascertain State practice with a view to establishing the
existence of a customary rule or a general principle, it is difficult, if not
impossible, to pinpoint the actual behaviour of the troops in the field for the
purpose of establishing whether they in fact comply with, or disregard, cer-
tain standards of behaviour. This examination is rendered extremely diffi-
cult by the fact that not only is access to the theatre of military operations
normally refused to independent observers (often even to the ICRC) but
information on the actual conduct of hostilities is withheld by the parties to
the conflict; what is worse, often recourse is had to misinformation with a
view to misleading the enemy as well as public opinion and foreign
Governments. 14 5
140. See Ewen MacAskill &Julian Borger, New NSA Leaks Show How US is Bugging its
European Allies, THE GuALRDL4 (June 30, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/
2013 /jun/30/nsa-leaks-us-bugging-european-allies [https://perma.cc/ZFM3-NETM].
141. See Philip Dorling, Exposed: Australia's Asia Spy Network, SYDNEY MORNING HER-
ALD (Oct. 31, 2013), https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/exposed-australias-asia-
spy-network-20131030-2whia.html [https://perma.cc/2BNZ-GZGX].
142. Tony Abbott, Speech to Australian House of Representatives (Nov. 19, 2013).
143. Deeks, supra note 10, at 312.
144. See Prosecutor v. Dugko Tadit, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on Defence
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 55 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
145. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, cl 55 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Oct. 2, 1995).
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Given "the inherent nature of this subject-matter," the Court was of the
view that customary international humanitarian rules must be extracted
from more reliable forms of State practice and opinio juris such as official
military documents produced by States.'
4 6
Reports produced by authoritative bodies have reached the same con-
clusion. For example, Principle 5 of the International Law Association's
report into the formation of custom explains that "[aicts do not count as
practice if they are not public."'1 4 7 In the cyber context specifically, then
Legal Advisor to the U.S. State Department Brian Egan explained that
"States should publicly state their views" on how international law applies
to cyberspace and that "[sitating such views publicly will help give rise to
more settled expectations of State behaviour and thereby contribute to
greater predictability and stability in cyberspace."' 48 That State practice
must be of a public character to contribute towards the development of CIL
was a recurrent theme in his speech.
14 9
The rationale for this requirement is that customary rules develop
according to an "iterative process of claim and response"' 5 0 (or, in Shaw's
words, "the process of claims and counter-claims") 15 1 between States.
152
When a State maintains that a norm has crystallized as CIL, it presents a
claim to the international society that the practice in question is lawful.
States are then provided with the opportunity to express their sovereignty
and react to that claim. In particular, States can either accept the claim
and contribute to the norm's customary development or reject the claim
and frustrate its transposition into customary law. Even if the claim is
accepted by a significant number of States and the norm crystalizes as cus-
tomary law, a State can nevertheless identify itself as a persistent objector
during that rule's development and thus opt out of the legal covenant that
146. Id. On the difficulty of identifying customary rules where State practice is con-
ducted in secret, see Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, supra
note 13, 1 57 (June 27).
147. COMM. ON FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY (GEN.) INT'L LAW, INT'L LAW ASS'N, FINAL
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE: STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO THE FORMArION OF
GENERAL CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 15 (2000). See also Wood, supra note 89, [ 47
(The Report on the identification of customary law notes that "[it is difficult to see how
[secret state] practice can contribute to the formation or identification of general cus-
tomary international law."); 1 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CuS-
TOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAw xl (2005) (noting that acts do not "contribute
to the formation of customary international law if they are never disclosed.").
148. Brian Egan, International Law and Stability in Cyberspace, 35 BERKELEY J. INT'L
LAw 169, 172 (2017).
149. Id.
150. Alexandra H. Perina, Black Holes and Open Secrets: The Impact of Covert Action on
International Law, 53 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 507, 567 (2015).
151. MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 62 (8th ed. 2017).
152. See COMM. ON FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY (GEN.) INT'L LAw, supra note 147, at 10
("It is often helpful to think of customary rules as emerging, in the typical case, from a
process of express or implied claim and response."). See also Myres S. McDougal & N.
A. Schlei, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspective: Lawful Measures for Security, 64 YALE
LJ. 648 (1955) (explaining that the process of customary international law formation is
one of continuous claim and response by sovereign equals).
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is otherwise binding upon all other States.' 53
For these processes to occur, State practice must be committed pub-
licly because it is only where State practice is "conspicuous"'154 and
"detectable"' 55 that States are able "to respond to [a putative customary
rule] positively or negatively."'156 In consequence, it can be concluded that
secret State practice is methodologically irrelevant' 57 to the development
of CIL, 1 5 8 unless it is subsequently disclosed to the international society.
Thus, physical acts of espionage committed in secret on the ground
cannot be classified as State practice for the purpose of CIL formation. 159
153. See Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1951 I.C.J. 116, 128 (Dec.
18). See generally JAMES A. GREEN, THE PERSISTENT OBJECTOR RULE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2016).
154. Shaw, supra note 151, at 59.
155. Franiois G~ny, Mtthode d'interpretation et Sources en Droit Prive Positif, section
110 (1899), quoted in ANTHONY D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 49 (1971).
156. Yoram Dinstein, The Interaction between Customary Law and Treaties, 322 COL-
LECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INT'L L. 1, 275 (2007) ("Another condition
for State conduct-if it is to count in assessing the formation of custom-is that it must
be transparent, so as to enable other States to respond to it positively or negatively.");
Daniel Bethlehem, The Secret Life of International Law, 1 CAMBRIDGE J. INT'L & COMP. L.
23, 35-36 (2012) (explaining that State practice "must be public, at one level, for rea-
sons of predictability, for reasons of accountability, for reasons of opposability, and for
reasons of objection. So, at one level conduct must be public in order to be appreciable
for reasons of the law."); Herman Meijers, How is International Law Made? The Stages of
Growth in International Law and the Use of Its Customary Rules, 9 NEmH. Y.B. INT'L L. 3, 19
(1978) ("States concur in the creation of law by not protesting, that is to say, by not
reacting. If that is so, the states concerned must get an opportunity to react. From this
there flow two further requirements for the formation of law: it must be possible to
indicate at least one express manifestation of the will to create a law, and this express
manifestation of will must be cognoscible for all states which will be considered as
wishing to concur in the creation of the new rule if they do not protest."); Michael N.
Schmitt & Liis Vihul, The Nature of International Law Cyber Norms, 5 THE TALLINN
PAPERS 26 (2014) (Discussing CIL formation in cyberspace and observing
"[u]ndisclosed acts cannot, as a practical matter, amount to state practice contributing
to the emergence of customary international law.").
157. It is important to stress that secrecy does not mean that State conduct is illegal
under international law, only that it cannot contribute towards the development of CIL.
Whether secret State practice is lawful will depend upon the primary rules of interna-
tional law that are implicated.
158. See COMM. ON FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY (GEN.) INT'L LAW, supra note 147, at 3
(explaining that, up until the end of the 19th Century customary law evolved incredibly
slowly because diplomacy was largely conducted bilaterally and in secret). Reports sug-
gest that States enter into 'spy agreements,' such as the Five Eyes agreement between the
USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the UK; Julian Borger, 'NSA Files: What's a
Little Spying Between Old Friends?', THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 2, 2013), https://www.theguard-
ian.com/world/2013/dec/02/nsa-files-spying-allies-enemies-five-eyes-g8 [https://
perma.cc/H47W-L3R4]. These agreements are invariably concluded in secret. It is our
contention that this type of State conduct does not constitute State practice for the pur-
pose of CIL formation precisely because of its secret (that is, non-public) character.
However, we express no view on whether secret treaties are permissible under interna-
tional law. For further discussion, see generally Megan Donaldson, 'The Survival of the
Secret Treaty: Publicity, Secrecy, and Legality in the International Order,' 111 AMERICAN J.
INT'L L. 575 (2017).
159. But see Lotrionte, supra note 12, at 475 (explaining that "[i]n the practice of
states . . . as the Cold War evolved, espionage became a systematic, publicly recognized
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As the International Law Association's report into customary law explains,
"a secret physical act (e.g., secretly 'bugging' diplomatic premises) is proba-
bly not an example of the objective element [of State practice].' 160 In a
similar vein, Khalil contends that "[acts of States] do not contribute [to the
formation of international law] if they are conducted in secrecy and not
communicated to other states, as is the case with spying".16 1 On the inad-
missibility of secret State practice in the context of espionage the views of
Ratner are also edifying:
With intelligence gathering. .. all the evidence is secret. How can we possi-
bly even know how states are interpreting a treaty, or what they regard as a
norm of custom, if they will not acknowledge what they are doing or
whether and how they believe it is legal? Even if a state has an interest in
acting according to law, it will not publicly reveal its interpretation and in
many cases will have reasons to avoid public protest of claims by other states
that it rejects. 162
In sum, peacetime espionage is a practice that is often committed in secret,
i.e., it is not disclosed to the international society. As a consequence,
the inherent nature of this practice means that most of its manifestations
cannot contribute to CIL formation. This being said, other forms of public
State practice may exist to support the existence of customary exceptions.
1. Domestic Law Authorizing Acts of Peacetime Espionage
For many years States were able to cite and rely upon the threats and
dangers that were prevalent within the world order to justify the secrecy
that surrounded their espionage activities.' 63 Due largely to the scale and
pervasiveness of cyber-enabled espionage, in recent years the view has
emerged that state-sponsored spying is "out of control"' 6 4 and this has put
pressure upon States-and in particular liberal democratic States-to
ensure that the activities of their intelligence agencies are more transparent
and subject to greater oversight. 165
form of state activity essential to the conduct of international relations, with almost all
countries actively engaging in the practice.").
160. COMM. ON FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY (GEN.) INT'L LAW, supra note 147, at 15. See
also id. (noting that "[i]nternal memoranda are therefore not, as such, forms of State
practice, and the confidential opinions of Government legal advisers, for instance, are
not examples of the objective element of custom."); Andrea da Rocha Ferriera, et al.,
Formation and Evidence of Customary International Law, 1 UFRGS MODEL U.N. J. 182,
201 (2013) (Arguing "acts such as secret military instruction and internal memoranda
would not count as State practice".).
161. Khalil, supra note 10, at 939.
162. Steven Ratner, Introduction, 28 MICH. J. INT'L L. 539, 539 (2007).
163. Remarkably, it was not until 1986 that the United Kingdom was prepared to
publicly admit that M16-its foreign intelligence agency-existed. See Luke Jones, The
Time When Spy Agencies Officially Didn't Exist, BBC NEws (Nov. 8, 2004), http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-29938135 [https://perma.cc/FH8X-HKZQ].
164. Jon Moran & Clive Walker, Intelligence Powers and Accountability in the U.K., in
GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT: GOVERNING SECURITY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 289,
289 (Zachary K. Goldman & Samuel J. Rascoff eds., 2016).
165. See Zachary K. Goldman & Samuel J. Rascoff, Introduction, in GLOBAL INTELLI-
GENCE OVERSIGHT: GOVERNING SECURITY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY xvii (Zachary K.
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Although actual instances of espionage on the ground have continued
to be conducted in secret, States have adopted a plethora of measures to
enhance the accountability of their intelligence agencies. In relation to this
Article, the most important of these is that States have sought to provide a
clear legal basis for the functions of their intelligence agencies and to delin-
eate the extent of their powers within national law. 16 6 This has allowed for
the-perhaps unique-emergence of public State practice concerning
espionage.167
It is important to identify whether States have adopted publicly
promulgated laws that provide their intelligence agencies with the legal
authority to conduct espionage against other States because it is well
accepted that "legislation is an important aspect of State practice."'
1 6 8
According to the ILC, "[t]he term legislation is here employed in a compre-
hensive sense; it embraces the constitutions of States, the enactments of
their legislative organs, and the regulations and declarations promulgated
by executive and administrative bodies." 16 9
Scholars have increasingly argued that public State practice in support
of customary exceptions can be established on the basis that States have
adopted domestic laws that authorize their intelligence agencies to engage
in this conduct. Lotrionte, for example, explains that "[tioday, many states
have open laws that provide explicit details about the authorities and limi-
tations that have been granted to intelligence organizations within the
state."1 70 Similarly, the Tallinn Manual 2.0 notes that "a number of States
have by domestic law authorised their security services to engage in espio-
nage, including cyber espionage." 17 1
The terminology utilized by the Tallinn Manual 2.0 is startling
because, to the best of our knowledge, no State has adopted domestic laws
that explicitly invoke the concept of peacetime espionage when delineating
the permissible functions of its intelligence services. This is a sharp con-
trast to the national (usually criminal) laws of many States that often use
the term espionage to describe foreign nationals that collect confidential
Goldman & Samuel J. Rascoff eds., 2016) (arguing that "the oversight of intelligence
agencies is undergoing major transformation."). See generally Alan Travis, Snowden leak:
governments' hostile reaction fuelled public's distrust of spies, THE GuAuDIA (June 15,
2015), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/15/snowden-files-us-uk-govern-
ment-hostile-reaction-distrust-spies [https://perma.cc/4GCN-ZLWV].
166. See Zachary K. Goldman & Samuel J. Rascoff, Introduction, in GLOBAL INTELLI-
GENCE OVERSIGHT: GOVERNING SECURITY IN THE TwENTY-FIRST CENTURY xvii-xviii (Zachary
K. Goldman & Samuel J. Rascoff eds., 2016).
167. Further examples of public State practice relating to peacetime espionage could
possibly be found in cases of exchange of spies and spying in international spaces.
These will be the subject of future work.
168. Int'l Law Comm'n, Rep. of the International Law Commission covering its Sec-
ond Session, U.N. Doc. A/1316, at 370 (1950).
169. Id.
170. Lotrionte, supra note 12, at 478. See id. ("Most domestic legal systems... seek
to prohibit intelligence gathering by foreign agents while protecting the state's own
capacity to conduct such activities abroad"); Chesterman, supra note 4, at 1072.
171. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 25, at 169.
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political information within their borders. 172
Of course, espionage is merely a concept. What is important is that
we look at the substance of domestic laws and determine whether States
have clearly authorized internationally wrongful acts of espionage. The
United States provides a vivid illustration of a State that confers upon its
intelligence agencies ample legal authority to collect foreign intelligence.
For example, Section 102 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978 (FISA) provides that, "[n]otwithstanding any other law, the President,
through the Attorney General, may authorize electronic surveillance with-
out a court order under this title to acquire foreign intelligence informa-
tion" from persons, facilities or property located within the US.'
73
This provision is interesting in the context of this Article because,
when the FISA bill was being debated by the Senate Committee on Intelli-
gence before it was enacted as law, the Committee recognized the view that
the activities authorized by Section 102 may violate the US's international
legal obligations under the VCDR, such as where United States intelligence
services collect intelligence from diplomatic missions located within the
US. 1 7 4 In response, the Committee noted that "the 'notwithstanding any
other law' language is intended to make clear that, notwithstanding the
Vienna Convention [on Diplomatic Relations], the activities authorized by
this bill may be conducted.' 175 Thus, as far as the Committee was con-
cerned, Section 102 provides intelligence agencies with clear legal author-
ity to conduct electronic surveillance against diplomatic missions
notwithstanding the fact that such conduct contravenes the VCDR.
Whereas "traditional FISA"'17 6 authorizes and regulates the collection
of foreign intelligence within the US, Executive Order 12333 (issued in
1981) authorizes intelligence agencies to collect intelligence from targets
located outside of the US. 1 7 7
In 2008 the FISA Amendments Act (FAA) was adopted. 1 78 Sections
703 and 704 FAA provide intelligence agencies with the legal authority to
target U.S. persons located outside of the United States whereas Section
702 provides legal authority to target non-U.S. persons located outside of
the United States with the compelled assistance of communications service
providers. 1 79 The FAA has therefore expanded the scope of FISA, incorpo-
rating within its framework intelligence activities that had previously been
conducted pursuant to Executive Order 12333. Thus, Executive Order
12333 now operates residually, only applying in those circumstances that
172. See, e.g., U.S. Espionage Act, H.R. 291, 65th Cong. (1917) (enacted); Criminal
Code Amendment (Espionage and Related Matters) Act 2002 (Austrl.)
173. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. § 1802 (1978) (empha-
sis added).
174. H.R. Rep. No. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 70 (1977).
175. Id.
176. "Traditional FISA" is the name given to FISA before it was amended in 2008. See
Director of National Intelligence, The FISA Amendments Act: Q&A (Apr. 18, 2017), at 1.
177. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59, 941 (Dec. 4, 1981).
178. FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 112 Stat. 2436(2008).
179. Id. §§ 702-04.
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are not covered by FISA and FAA, 180 such as the collection of information
from targets outside of the United States without the compelled assistance
of communications service providers.1 8 1
In addition, legislative developments in Canada provide the Canadian
Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) with clear legal authority to collect con-
fidential information. The Canadian example is particularly interesting
given that in 2008 the Federal Court of Canada held that the CSIS could
not undertake espionage operations within the territory of another State
because it was internationally wrongful and the authorizing legislation did
not set aside Canada's international legal commitments.' 8 2 Partly in
response to that decision,' 8 3 in 2015 Canada introduced various amend-
ments to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act 1984.184 Section
12(1) of this Act was amended to read that "[t]he Service shall collect, by
investigation or otherwise, to the extent that it is strictly necessary, and
analyse and retain information and intelligence respecting activities that
may on reasonable grounds be suspected of constituting threats to the
security of Canada," and under Section 12(2) the intelligence agency is
expressly authorized to perform this function "within or outside
Canada."' 8 5 Section 21(3.1) was amended to permit the CSIS to seek and
obtain a warrant from the Federal Court for surveillance in foreign States,
which reads, "[wiithout regard to any other law, including that of any foreign
state, a judge may, in a warrant issued under subsection (3), authorize
activities outside Canada to enable the Service to investigate a threat to the
security of Canada.' 8 6
180. THE PRESIDENT's REVIEw GROUP ON INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONs TECHNOL-
OGlES, LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD 70 (Dec. 12, 2003).
181. Mention should be made here of Presidential Policy Directive 28, which was
issued by President Obama in response the fallout from the Snowden revelations. PPD-
28 does not provide new legal authority for the collection of signals intelligence but
instead reiterates that such conduct can only be pursued where it is authorized by law.
See Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, Presidential Policy Direc-
tive-Signals Intelligence Activities (Jan. 17, 2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.
gov/the-press-office/2014/01/17/presidential-policy-directive-signals-intelligence-activi-
ties [https://perma.cc/LMW8-K7HZ] (The contribution of PPD-28 is that it sets "new
limits . . .[which] are intended to protect the privacy and civil liberties of all persons,
whatever their nationality and regardless of where they might reside." These limits
restrict the use of signals intelligence to detecting and countering six types of actual
threats: (1) espionage; (2) terrorism; (3) weapons of mass destruction; (4) cyber secur-
ity; (5) threats to U.S. or allied military personnel; and (6) transnational criminal
threats.").
182. See Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act (Re), [2008] F.C. 301 (Can.). See
also Craig Forcese, The Federal Court's Prescience: Spying and International Law, NAT'L
SECURITY L.: CANADIAN PRACTICE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Nov. 21, 2013), http://
craigforcese.squarespace.com/national-security-law-blog/2013/11/21/the-federal-
courts-prescience-spying-and-intemational-law.html [https://perma.cc/XW4J-E8LK].
183. Protection of Canada from Terrorists Act, 2014-15, H.C. Bill C-44, c. 9. For an
overview of these legislative developments, see CRAIG FORCESE & KENT ROACH, FALsE
SECURITY: THE RADICALIZATION OF CANADA'S TERROR LAws 3-7 (2015).
184. See id.
185. See id.
186. See id. (emphasis added). In response to these developments, Forcese explains
that "I have never seen (and I have started looking in earnest) a state codify so clearly in
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Other States have also implemented laws that permit the collection of
information abroad-which also presumably includes information from
closed sources-where necessary to maintain national security. 187 This
was recognized by the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy when
he explained that "a number of States have begun to adopt laws that pur-
port to authorize them to conduct extra-territorial surveillance or to inter-
cept communications in foreign jurisdictions";18 8 the Special Rapporteur
went on to note that "[tihese developments suggest an alarming trend
towards the extension of surveillance powers beyond territorial
borders." 18 9
The language employed by the Special Rapporteur is significant and
requires emphasis: for now, there is only a "trend" being set by "a number
of States" towards the adoption of domestic laws that authorize espionage
abroad. It is also apparent that the majority of States that have adopted
these types of laws are organized upon a liberal democratic basis, indicat-
ing that the available State practice is far from representative of all seg-
ments of the international society. The Tallinn Manual 2.0 also records
that "a number of States" have adopted domestic laws that authorize their
intelligence agencies to conduct espionage abroad but, tellingly, it only
cites 6 examples to support this contention, all of which are liberal democ-
racies from Europe (namely, Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, the
United Kingdom, Sweden and Switzerland). 190
The takeaway point is that mere trends in State practice do not give
rise to customary rules.19 1 Of course, if other States adopt domestic laws
authorizing espionage abroad, public State practice will accumulate. But it
its law books that it's organs will authorize spying in another state, regardless of the law
of that state. States spy all the time, of course. But this is real Canadian honesty. I
think I admire that." Craig Forcese, A Longer Arm for CSIS: Assessing the Extraterritorial
Spying Provisions, NAT'L SECURITY L.: CANADIAN PRACTICE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
(Oct. 28, 2014), http://craigforcese.squarespace.com/national-security-law-blog/ 201 4/
1 0/28/a-longer-arm-for-csis-assessing-the-extraterritorial-spying.html/ [https://
perma.cc/NGH9-GLGM.
187. E.g., New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Act 1969, s 4AA (N.Z.); Intelli-
gence Services Act 2001 (Cth) ss 6-7 (Austl.); Security Authorities Act 2000, § 7(1)(1)
(Est.); Ley 11/2002, de 6 de mayo, reguladora del Centro Nacional de Inteligencia,
§ 2(a) (B.O.E. 2002, 8628) (Spain); Legge 3 agosto 2007, n.124, in G.U. Aug. 13, 2007,
n.187, § 6(2) (It.); Denmark Act, No 602, § 3(2), 12 June 2003 (Den.).
188. Frank La Rue, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of
the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, ' 64, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/40 (Apr. 17,
2013).
189. Id. 1 64.
190. TALLINN MANIUAL 2.0, supra note 25, at 169.
191. An analogy can be made to the In re Newfoundland Continental Shelf case. As
explained above, in this case the Supreme Court had to determine whether CIL con-
ferred upon States the right to explore and exploit in the continental shelf that runs
along their coastline. The Court found that national laws can constitute instances of
State practice for the purpose of CIL formation and proceeded to identify around 15
national laws where States had claimed the right to explore and exploit in the continen-
tal shelf. Importantly, the Court rejected the customary status of this right on the basis
that the sample of available State practice was too small or, in the words of the Court,
'[not] sufficiently widespread to constitute a general practice'; In re Newfoundland Conti-
nental Shelf, supra note 129, at 124. In light of this, at present there are too few
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is only where this State practice becomes widespread within, and represen-
tative of, the international society that it can support the existence of cus-
tomary espionage exceptions.
IV. Opinio Juris
Even if there is widespread and representative public State practice of
espionage, it is still necessary to show that this practice is coupled with
"evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the exis-
tence of a rule of [customary] law requiring it" (opinio juris).192 This "psy-
chological factor" 193 is critical in order to "distinguish between those
practices of States that result merely from political expedience, diplomacy,
domestic policy, or habit-that is, those practices that neither create nor
evidence legal obligations-and those that flow from legal obligations." 194
In the absence of opinio juris there is no CIL but mere "usage." 195 Evi-
dence of opinio juris can be gleaned from a variety of sources, including
diplomatic correspondence, case law of national courts, opinions of gov-
ernment legal advisers, treaty practice and their travaux pr paratoires, dip-
lomatic protests or claims in legal briefs before courts and tribunals. 196
In the Nicaragua case the ICJ considered under what circumstances
CIL can give rise to customary exceptions, which is the issue under exami-
nation here. The ICJ noted that where,
A state acts in a way prima facie incompatible with a recognized rule, but
defends its conduct by appealing to exceptions or justifications contained
within the rule itself, then whether or not the State's conduct is in fact justifi-
able on that basis, the significant of that attitude is to confirm rather than to
weaken the rule.19 7
The Court accepted, however, that customary exceptions to primary rules
could form if the pioneer State expressly claims that its conduct creates a
new legal right under customary law and this claim is "shared in principle
by other States."'198 In essence, the ICJ is saying that pioneer States must
explicitly claim new rights under CIL before customary exceptions to pri-
mary rules can be carved out.
instances of domestic laws authorizing espionage abroad to conclude that there is a
general practice in favor of this activity.
192. Id. 1 77.
193. Shaw, supra note 151, at 55.
194. JOHN H. CURRIE, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, ESSENTIALs OF CANADIAN LAw 170
(2001). See also Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, supra note
13, c 206 (The ICJ noted that "[t]he United States authorities have on some occasions
clearly stated their grounds for intervening in the affairs of a foreign State for reasons
connected with, for example, domestic policies of that country, its ideology, the level of
its armaments, or the direction of its foreign policy. But there were statements of inter-
national policy, and not assertions of rules of existing international law.").
195. Id. at 170.
196. See Report of the International Law Commission: Seventieth Session, supra note 88,
Conclusion 10(2).
197. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, supra note 13, 1
186.
198. Id. 207.
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Little to no opinio juris supports the existence of customary espionage
exceptions. In considering opinio juris, we first (a) outline States' view
towards peacetime espionage generally before turning (b) to States' reac-
tions to specific spying incidents which violate international law; we will
treat the subject from an historical standpoint, since the un-crystalized
state of CIL on espionage can only be understood in light of the discrete
treatment it has undergone in centuries past; and (c) we will complete this
discussion by looking at other sources of opinio juris.
A. The Policy of Silence
Few scholars have explored the attitude of States towards espionage
and, of those that have, they have tended to find opinio juris in mere policy
statements rather than legal assertions. 199 This is a significant misstep
because, as one of the present authors has contended elsewhere, States
have adopted a policy of silence (POS) when it comes to their espionage
activities. 20 0 POS is the name given to a discrete process whereby States
circumvent the resolution of incidents arising from acts of espionage by
pursuing solutions in multiple branches of international law rather than
pursuing a CIL of espionage. This stifles opinio juris on the subject.
States' silence about spying is remarkable and evidenced in at least
two ways. First, States have had the opportunity to express opinio juris on
peacetime espionage on multiple occasions. Given the number of times the
issue has arisen-before UN bodies such as the General Assembly and the
Security Council, in cases before the ICJ or discussions within the ILC-
one would expect States to have set forth their views on the matter, even if
they fell short of regulating espionage conventionally. The fact is, States
have very much shied away from this discussion, thereby precluding cus-
tomary espionage exceptions from emerging.
Second, States have been careful to regulate peacetime espionage
through a patois of legal euphemisms ('acts incompatible with the diplo-
matic function'; 'non-innocent passage'; 'flights inconsistent with the aims
of the Convention'; 'peaceful purposes', etc.)-that is, States have made "an
almost conscious effort to avoid a solution in terms of espionage."' 20 1 The
practical effect of this patois is to allow States to discuss and even condemn
espionage activities without making public their opinio juris about espio-
nage conducted through different means. The following section will illumi-
nate the existence of this POS and show how it stifles the emergence of
customary espionage exceptions.
199. For further discussion on opinio juris see Navarrete, supra note 10, at 17.
200. See id. (noting that "Ila politique du silence ne permet pas de d~velopper des
normes prohibitives ou permissives incr~mentales.") ["[t]he policy of silence does not
permit the incremental development of prohibitive or permissive legal rules relating to
espionage."] (our translation); Forcese, supra note 14, at 68.
201. Edmondson, supra note 28, at 446 (emphasis added).
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1. Air Law
Air law offered the first possibility to deal with peacetime espionage.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, States considered the possibility
of protecting their sovereignty through a sovereign right granted expressly
for the repression of espionage 20 2 in a regime of free, open skies. Instead,
they ultimately created a highly restricted regime of air law in which any
trespass into a nation's airspace violates international law.20 3 Injured
States are thus free to condemn solely unauthorized entries, or to brand
them in terms of espionage to obtain diplomatic gains. 20 4 In the wake of
the 1983 KAL 007 incident, States had the chance to revisit the question of
whether they should address espionage explicitly within the context of air
law. The Korean plane-allegedly a spy-plane working on behalf of the
USA2 05-was shot down by the USSR when it deviated into USSR airspace
for unknown reasons, resulting in the loss of 269 civilian lives. 20 6 As a
result, States adopted an amendment to the Chicago Convention, according
to which States must refrain from using force against civil aircrafts in flight
and are entitled to require their landing when the aircrafts are being used
for "any purpose inconsistent with the aims of the Convention." 20 7
202. The first important proposal on the subject of the legal status of the airspace
above national territory came from French legal scholar Fauchille, who proposed a doc-
trine of freedom of the air, subject to conservation rights in subjacent States, including a
right to suppress espionage. See Paul Fauchille, Rtgime juridique des aerostats, 19
ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT DE DROIT INT'L 19 (1902). See also Note, Legal Aspects of Recon-
naissance in Airspace and Outer Space, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 1074, 1076 (1961); Institut de
Droit International, Resolution on the Law of the Air, 19 INSTITUT DE DROIT INT'L Y.B. 32,
art. 7 (1902); Michel Tremblay, The Legal Status of Military Aircraft in International
Law (Nov. 2003) (thesis submitted to McGill University, Faculty of Law, Institute of Air
and Space Law), at 22.
203. Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, supra note 44 (reaffirming
the principle of State sovereignty of national airspace). On the history of the Conven-
tion, see DEP'T OF DEF., OFF. GEN. COUNSEL, AN ASSESSMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
ISSUES IN INFORMATION OPERATIONS 2 (1999).
204. See Fabien Lafouasse, L'espionnage en droit international, 47 ANNUARE FRANCAls
DE DROIT INT'L 63, 123 (2001).
205. See generally John T. Phelps II, Aerial Intrusions by Civil and Military Aircraft in
Time of Peace, 107 MIL. L. REv. 255, 302 (1985); Suzette V. Suarez, Korean Air Lines
Incident (1983), OXFORD PUB. INT'L L. (Dec. 2007), http://opil.ouplaw.com/abstract/
10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-el183?rskey=LQLRHI&result
=13&prd=EPIL [https://perma.cc/JZP6-3QKE]; Dale Stephens & Tristan Skousgaard,
Military Reconnaissance, OXFORD PUB. INT'L L. (May 2009), http://opil.ouplaw.com/
view/ 10. 1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e335 [https://perma.cc/
S5E9-E493]; Emilia Chiavarelli, The KAL 007 Incident: The Legal Effects of ICAO Deci-
sions 49 (1984) (thesis Submitted to McGill University, Faculty of Law, Institute of Air
and Space Law), at 49.
206. Chiavarelli, supra note 205, at 200.
207. Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, supra note 44, art. 3bis. See
also Robin Gei8, Civil Aircraft as Weapons of Large-Scale Destruction: Countermeasures,
Article 3BIS of the Chicago Convention, and the Newly Adopted German "Luftsicherheit-
sgesetz", 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 227, 239 (2005) ("The events which led to the adoption of
article 3bis were largely interstate incidents in which civil aircraft had trespassed sover-
eign airspace, overflown military sensitive areas, and were suspected of being engaged in
espionage on behalf of their state of registration.").
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Unsurprisingly, this new phrase on 'inconsistent purposes' became
the proxy by which States alluded to espionage activities during meetings.
At least one State felt compelled to tackle the issue of espionage expressly
by defining the phrase with a list of prohibited activities, including "acts of
espionage,"20 8 but States did not retain this proposal. Taking up this
point, one delegate expressly referred to POS, noting that "[a]ll the pro-
posed amendments [are] one sided in the sense that almost no emphasis
[is] laid on the prohibition of States from resort to the use of aviation for
espionage. '20 9 In the delegate's view, it was important that the amend-
ment deter States from spying, otherwise "any amendment, no matter how
beautifully it might be framed, [would be] nothing but a toothless bull-
dog."210 Yet, most States remained impervious to this outcry.
2. Law of the Sea
States displayed a similar attitude in sketching the notion of 'innocent
passage' in territorial waters. Article 19(2)(c) UNCLOS makes espionage
inherently non-innocent.2 1 1 Importantly, however, States avoided discuss-
ing peacetime espionage. 2 12 The history of the drafting of Article 19(2)(c)
is more than revealing on this point. In 1973, Fiji presented a series of
draft articles that supplied a list of "activities" that could render the pas-
sage non-innocent, including a new paragraph (f) describing "any act of
espionage affecting the defence or security of the coastal State."'2 13 But
interestingly, States opted for the wording "any act aimed at collecting
information," which was later enshrined into UNCLOS in preference to the
term 'espionage.' Presumably, States intentionally left the terms ambigu-
ous to paper over the differences in their views, or perhaps, simply because
they did not wish to discuss espionage. At any rate, this language allows
States to condemn "non-innocent" passages in territorial waters 2 14 (a clear
208. During the 25th (extraordinary) Session of the ICAO Assembly on April 30,
1984, Cuba defined 'acts inconsistent with the aims of the Convention' as "[a]cts of
aggression, infiltration or espionage involving discharge of harmful substances or patho-
genic agents; transport of contraband or prohibited traffic using the airspace of another
State, even with destination to a third State or with any other purpose inconsistent with
the aims of the Convention." See Int'l Civil Aviation Org. [ICAO], Minutes of the Sixth
Meeting. Monday, 30 April 1984, at 9, ICAO Doc. A25-Min. EX/6 (1984). See also
RUWANTISSA ABEYRATNE, CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION: A COMMENTARY
75 (2014).
209. ICAO, Minutes of the Seventh Meeting. Tuesday, 1 May 1984, at 11, ICAO Doc.
A25-Min. EX/7 (1984).
210. Id. But see, ICAO, Minutes of the Sixth Meeting, supra note 208, at 13 (Chief
delegate of the USSR stating that acts of intelligence gathering should be included in the
definition of intruder aircraft).
211. See Kraska, supra note 67, at 219.
212. See GEORGE K. WALKER, DEFINITIONS FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA TERMS NOT DEFINED
BY THE 1982 CONVENTION 228 (2011).
213. See Navarrete, supra note 10, at 6. See also CARLOS EsPALIU BERDUD, LE PASSAGE
INOFFENSIF DES NAVIRES DE GUERRE TRANGERS DANS LA MER TERRITORIALE 42 (2007).
214. That is, the exercise of a conditional right. See Sam Bateman, Security and the
Law of the Sea in East Asia: Navigational Regimes and Exclusive Economic Zones, in THE
LAW OF THE SEA: PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS 365, 367 (David Freestone, Richard Barnes &
David M. Ong eds., 2006).
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legal euphemism) without having to discuss espionage.
How does this translate into practice? On the rare2 15 occasion that a
coastal State takes the necessary steps to prevent the passage of a foreign
ship conducting espionage in its territorial sea,2 16 "[tlhe spying state is
compelled to justify the innocence of its passage and the aggrieved state
minimizes the risk that it will be estopped from raising the issue by its own
espionage that is conducted in a different manner." 2 17 The outcome, then,
is that States have remained silent on the thorny question of espionage and
employed a patois that shuns a legally loaded label.
3. Diplomatic and Consular Law
Diplomatic relations have always been the playground of euphemisms.
As noted earlier, the VCDR "both implicitly accept[s] limited intelligence
gathering as an inevitable element of diplomacy and explicitly grant[s] an
absolute discretion to terminate that relationship at will."'2 18 The key point
is that when States are caught spying, it is dealt with entirely within what
the ICJ, in its Tehran Hostages dictum, described as a "self-contained
regime."2 19 Much like the innocent-passage regime, this regime provides
its own remedies and legal euphemisms, thus allowing the emergence of a
practice where States justify their actions with reference to appropriate and
inappropriate activities-and not espionage. 2 20 As such, receiving States
can, and often do, declare diplomats persona non grata for "activities
incompatible with their diplomatic status" (another euphemism for
spying). 22 1
Additionally, States have shown an unmistakable POS when discuss-
ing diplomatic espionage, even though routine abuse of the VCDR may lead
to its desuetude. 2 22 Thus, during a 1984 meeting of the ILC on the status
of the diplomatic bag and courier, one delegate noted that he "had been
struck by the fact [that the discussion on espionage] had come up for con-
215. See id. at 368 (as Bateman notes, the covert nature of these acts makes them
difficult to detect for coastal states).
216. See UNCLOS, supra note 42, art. 25.
217. Edmondson, supra note 28, at 446.
218. Simon Chesterman, Secret intelligence, OXFORD PUB. INT'L L. (Jan. 2009), 11 11,
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-
e992 [https://perma.cc/GT62-F3BA].
219. Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v.
Iran), Judgment, 1980 I.CJ. 3, 1 86 (May 24). While the particular wording of the ICJ's
dictum has been severely criticized by some as a jurisprudential 'overkill,' the fact
remains that the VCDR provides special remedies in reaction to abuses of the diplomatic
function. For a critique of the Court's dictum, see Bruno Simma & Dirk Pulkowski, Of
Planets and the Universe: Self-contained Regimes in International Law, 17 EUR. J. IN'L L.
484 (2006).
220. See Chesterman, supra note 4, at 1089.
221. VCDR, supra note 26, art. 9(1); see Robert Windrem, How does the U.S. decide
which Russians to throw out of the country?, NBC NEws (Mar. 29, 2018), https://
www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/how-does-u-s-decide-which-russians-throw-out-coun-
try-n860916 [https://perma.cc/R4VQ-TVPG] (explaining common terms relating to
espionage).
222. See Navarrete, supra note 10, at 7, 44.
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sideration only at the present time. The international community had obvi-
ously been avoiding any discussion.. . for a long time," adding that this was
understandable because "[nlo one was completely innocent.... Everyone
was trying to find out what others were doing; everyone engaged in that
exercise, but everyone denied it."2
2 3
Regarding consular relations, it would seem that the subject of espio-
nage never even raised its head in the travaux preparatoires of the VCCR.
At least, that is what a Pakistani Agent asserted in a rare statement before
the ICJ in the Jadhav case. 22 4 Discussing the elaboration of the VCCR, the
Agent argued that "[t]here is no reference to espionage [or] spying ... in
the travaux [because] not that long ago [the] Soviet Union and the United
States of America were engaged in what is known as the Cold War, and we
all accepted the fiction that there were no spies."'2 25 If this bold remark was
made in the context of the applicability of consular rights to an alleged
spy, 22 6 the POS is explicit. This statement reinforces the idea that States
have long regarded espionage as a "dirty word."'2 27
4. Space Law
With the making of the Outer Space Treaty,2 28 States once again had
the opportunity to express their views about espionage and reconnaissance
conducted in outer space. It is telling that many States expressed unease in
discussing espionage during meetings and explained that prohibiting such
223. Int'l Law Comm'n, Status of the diplomatic courier and the diplomatic bag not
accompanied by the diplomatic courier, Summary Record 1845th Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/
CN.4/SR.1845, at 185-186 (1984).
224. See Jadhav (India v. Pak.), Provisional Measures, 2017 I.CJ. 231, 242 (May 18).
225. Jadhav Case (India v. Pak.), Verbatim Record, 2017 I.CJ. 168 (May 15, 2017, 3
p.m), at 20, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/168/168-20170515-
ORA-02-00-BI.pdf [https://perma.cc/BGK4-2X75]. But see, e.g., Int'l Law Comm'n,
Documents of the Twelfth Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/131, A/CN.4/L.86, at 58,
reprinted in [1960] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 52, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1960/ADD.1
(where members of the ILC considered whether it might be desirable that local authori-
ties not be obligated to inform the consul in cases of espionage). This point was further
developed in the oral proceedings. See Jadhav Case (India v. Pak.), Verbatim Record,
2019 I.CJ. (Feb. 19, 2019, 10 a.m.), at 41 (noting that States had adopted a position of
"studied ambiguity," with the consequences that it cannot be said that there is a general
practice accepted as law by States to provide consular access in cases where espionage
was reasonably suspected), available at https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/168/
168-20190219-ORA-01-00-BI.pdf [https://perma.cc/9XD5-T4M3].
226. It is argued that Article 36 VCCR provides for a customary international law
exception with regards to espionage, i.e., that receiving States do not have to provide
consular access in cases of espionage. Given that no express reservation was made in
Article 36 VCCR for charges of espionage, and the apparent lack of consistent State
practice in this regard, the existence of such an exception is open to question. See gener-
ally Nicole M. Howell, A Proposal for U.S. Implementation of the Vienna Convention's Con-
sular Notification Requirement, 60 UCLA L. REv. 1324, 1336 (2013); Cindy Galway Buys,
Reflections on the 50th Anniversary of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 38 S.
ILL. U. LJ. 57, 63 (2013).
227. Chesterman, supra note 4, at 1076.
228. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18
U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205.
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activity was a top-level political decision.2 29 States found a way out of this
awkward discussion through artful ambiguity. Until 1963, the USSR and
other Soviet Bloc countries 2 30 held that reconnaissance activities con-
ducted in outer space were illegal under international law. Indeed, the
USSR took the lead on at least two occasions to prohibit2 3 ' or regulate 2 32
these activities. (This was, of course, only lip service, as the USSR ulti-
mately used its 'scientific' satellites to spy). By contrast, the United States
held that reconnaissance from points outside the territory of any state was
legal, a view shared by its allies such as Australia 23 3 and the United King-
dom.2 34 Evidently, the problem for States, then, was how to frame the
issue so as to not forestall ratification of the Treaty, while allowing the two
superpowers to uphold their opposing views about espionage.
States found the answer in Article IV of the Treaty, which has been
dubbed a "masterpiece of legal trompe-l'oeil.''2 35 It provides that "[tihe
229. See Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 17th Sess., 1 1th mtg. at 5, 234,
U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.11 (Aug. 21, 1962) ("A decision to alter the law [on espio-
nage] in that regard, by requiring all states to wave their legal rights, would be a top level
political decision and therefore all together outside the competence of the Legal Sub-
Committee to take on its own initiative.... The Legal Sub-Committee ... should not
allow itself to be tempted by the ambition to take up subjects that were beyond its com-
petence or that had already been referred to other international bodies, as for example
the question of ... so called 'intelligence' activities.").
230. See, e.g., U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., 1294th mtg. at 238, U.N. Doc. A/C. 1/SR.1294
(Dec. 7, 1962) (where the delegate of Czechoslovakia stated that "[i]nternational law
could not, indeed, authorize in outer space acts which it prohibited on earth or in the
atmosphere"); id. at 240 (where the delegate of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic
considered that the use of space for obtaining intelligence data was inadmissible).
231. See Comm. On the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, USSR: Draft Declaration of the
Basic Principles Governing the Activities of States Pertaining to the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/L.02 (Sept. 10, 1962), art. 8 ("The use of artificial
satellites for the collection of intelligence information in the territory of foreign States is
incompatible with the objectives of mankind in its conquest of outer space."). See also
McMahon, supra note 32, at 373.
232. The USSR introduced a proposed agreement for assistance to astronauts and
spacecraft landing in foreign territory in the Legal Subcommittee. See Comm. on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, USSR: Draft International Agreement on the Rescue of
Astronauts and Spaceships Making Emergency Landings, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 105/12 (May
6, 1963), art. 7 ("Space vehicles aboard which devices have been discovered for the col-
lection of intelligence information in the territory of another State shall not be
returned."). See also John Cobb Cooper, Current Developments in Space Law, 41 N.C. L.
REv. 339, 343 (1963).
233. See Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 17th Sess., lth mtg., supra
note 229, at 5 ("It would seem absolutely clear that to obtain information about the
earth by means of a space vehicle did not per se involve any breach of international
law.").
234. See Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 17th Sess., 10th mtg. at 4, U.N.
Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.10 (Aug. 21, 1962) ("[T]he United Kingdom held that observa-
tion from points outside the territory of any State was not contrary to international
law.").
235. Bin Cheng, Properly Speaking, Only Celestial Bodies Have Been Reserved for Use
Exclusively for Peaceful (Non-Military) Purposes, but Not Outer Void Space, in INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW ACROSS THE SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR L.C.
GREEN ON THE OCCASION OF His EIGHTIETH BIRTHDAY 81, 88 (Michael N. Schmitt ed.,
2000).
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moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the
Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. '2 36 With this piece of legal acro-
batics, the issue became not whether "espionage" was legal, but whether
the use of reconnaissance satellites from outer space fell within the realm
of "peaceful purposes." The sticking point of the analysis thus became
defining "peaceful purposes." States were of course content with ambigu-
ity, 23 7 as they were able to uphold their respective views on the legality
(peaceful means "non-aggressive") or illegality (peaceful means "non-mili-
tary") of intelligence gathering in outer space while not discussing espio-
nage generally.2 38 As time wore on, States agreed this to be a peaceful use
protected by international law.
2 3 9
In sum, espionage has come to represent a "dirty word" within inter-
national relations. 24° States have had the opportunity to discuss specific
acts of espionage or espionage generally on multiple occasions; and yet
they have offered no granular expressions on the subject. Taking a closer
look, we must also realize that States have purposively constructed the nec-
essary patois to preclude the formation of opinio juris on espionage. This
suggests that States have been assiduously careful that conventional devel-
opments in peacetime espionage did not spill over into CIL. This is signifi-
cant because customary exceptions cannot emerge from mere silence.
Does this silence mean that States deem most forms of espionage
unlawful? To be sure, it is difficult to make assumptions based on this POS
because silence may denote "indifference, conscious non-participation in
something considered illegal, lack of technical capacity, political maneuver
or whatever."'24 1 It is therefore necessary to turn to States' reactions to
international incidents involving espionage.
B. The Process of Claims and Counterclaims
As we have seen in the Nicaragua case, for a customary exception to
emerge, pioneer States must have formulated their claim in legal terms and
other States must have accepted that claim as law.2 4 2 This process is some-
236. See id. at 95.
237. See Frans G. von der Dunk, Customary International Law and Outer Space, in
REEXAMINING CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAw 346, 361 (Brian D. Lepard ed., 2017)
(speaking of the intentional vagueness of the clause). See also Craig Forcese, Creative
Ambiguity- International Law's Distant Relationship with Peacetime Spying, JusT SECURITY
(Nov. 14, 2013), https://www.justsecurity.org/3168/guest-post-creative-ambiguity-inter-
national-laws-distant-relationship-peacetime-spying/ [https://perma.cc/S2R6-GZ8P].
But see Navarrete, supra note 10, at 17 (stating that creative ambiguity is only one facet
of States' approach to peacetime espionage).
238. See Jinyuan Su, Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes: Non-Militarization, Non-
Aggression and Prevention of Weaponization, 36 J. SPACE L. 253, 254 (2010).
239. See id. at 258; Joseph R. Soraghan, Reconnaissance Satellites: Legal Characteriza-
tion and Possible Utilization for Peacekeeping, 13 McGILL LJ. 458, 489 (1967).
240. Chesterman, supra note 4, at 1076.
241. MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 437 (2005).
242. Of course, these claims have to be cast under international law and not national
law. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 27, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, 8 I.L.M. 679.
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times referred to as the process of 'claims and counterclaims,' as States
have the opportunity to claim new rights and other States are provided
with the opportunity to respond to those claims. As it is, States have rarely,
if ever,2 43 claimed a "right to spy" in exception to international law. Quite
the contrary, upon discovery acts of espionage have historically led to a
legal hat trick of plausible deniability, responding with (i) a denial; (ii)
'Neither Confirm Nor Deny'; or (iii) an attempt to excuse its behavior on
the basis of mistake. As we shall see, the consequence of these types of
response is to stall or rather cancel the emergence of customary exceptions.
Further, customary exceptions cannot emerge from (iv) extra-legal justifi-
cations or (v) mere silence on the basis that espionage is an indecorous
subject.
1. Denials
States have consistently refused to acknowledge their participation in
espionage activities. 2 44 Denials have been particularly prevalent in the
context of diplomatic espionage, where agents under diplomatic cover con-
duct espionage abroad in breach of the VCDR, and receiving States are
known to bug the embassies of the sending States: 245 "[w]hen micro-
phones have been found in embassies, protests have of course been made,
but the receiving State has never, so far as one knows, admitted that is had
243. See Wrange, supra note 30, at 321 (observing that no State "has publicly claimed
that espionage in all its forms is legal. On the contrary, states generally deny being
involved in illegal espionage, and admit only when there is full proof'). See also EILEEN
DENZA, DIPLOMATIC LAw: COMMENTARY ON THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELA-
TIONS 187 (4th ed. 2016) (observing that despite routine violation of the VCDR there is
"no indication whatsoever from public diplomatic exchanges of any attempt to justify
any forms of surveillance of diplomatic communications on any legal basis."); Forcese,
supra note 14, at 202 ("[Sjpying is a poor candidate for a customary international law
exception to sovereignty-whatever state practice exists in the area is hardly accompa-
nied by opinio juris."); Terry, supra note 10, at 191; Schmitt & Vihul, supra note 41, at
1645 (similarly noting the absence of opinio juris supporting the existence of a custom-
ary exception to the principle of territorial sovereignty in the context of cyber espio-
nage); Ian Brown & Douwe Korff, Foreign Surveillance: Law and Practice in a Global
Digital Environment, 3 EUR. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 243, 250 (2014).
244. See 1 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 619 (Ronald Roxburgh
ed., 1920) (stating that in regards to its spies under criminal prosecution, a State will
"never interfere, since it cannot officially confess to having commissioned a spy");
Edmondson, supra note 28, at 445-46 ("The law of peace seems to be settled in only one
situation: a secret agent captured within the interior of another state, under circum-
stances uncomphcated by a separate violation of international law, gives rise to an
exchange of notes, a protest and a denial."); Geoffrey B. Demarest, Espionage in Interna-
tional Law, 24 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 321, 340 (1996) ("Plausible denial was the
universal international posture regarding spies; intelligence overflights seemed to merit
the same response."); Perina, supra note 150, at 542 ("Historically, governments were
loath even to acknowledge that they engaged in covert activity, especially in peace-
time."). But see Beresford, supra note 12, at 114.
245. See DENZA, supra note 243, at 186 ("The usual response has rather been for the
facts to be denied by the State accused of surveillance and for the other to resort to more
effective particle and technological methods of protecting the secrecy of its own
communications.").
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installed them."'246 This protest-denial ritual is alive and well today. In the
case of cyber espionage, for instance, the United States pressed China to
provide an explanation for its clandestine entry into Google's servers in
2010-a cyber operation termed "Aurora. ' 24 7 The Chinese government
denied any involvement, wrapping this claim up with a call for increased
cooperation between States to combat Internet hacking. 248
Denials are not of a nature to yield an exception to international law.
Unlawful acts of espionage will not carve out an exception "as long as this
contrary practice is condemned by other States or denied by the govern-
ment itself and therefore does not represent its official practice. 249 Unless
and until a State acknowledges its conduct, there is, in the process of cus-
tom, no "claim, ' ' 25 0 and certainly no expression of opinio juris.
2. Neither Confirm Nor Deny
A second standard response by States is to "Neither Confirm Nor
Deny" (NCND) spying accusations. 25 ' In 2003, for instance, Pakistan
246. Id.
247. See generally Ellen Nakashima, Chinese Hackers Who Breached Google Gained
Access to Sensitive Data, U.S. Officials Say, WASH. POST (May 20, 2013), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/world/natinal-security/chinese-hackerswh-breached-google-
gained-access-to-sensitive-data-us-officials-say/2013/05/20/51330428-be34-1 1e2-89c9-
3be8095fe767-story.html?noredirect=on&utm term=.dbl3dcbdl7ef [https://perma.cc/
UK28-G2EQ].
248. See EMBASSY OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN THE UNITED STATES, Foreign
Ministry Spokesperson Ma Zhaoxu's Remarks on China-related Speech by US Secretary of
State on "Internet Freedom" (Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/fyrth/
t653351.htm [https://perma.cc/QQ76-XD6G] ("We resolutely oppose such remarks and
practices that contravene facts and undermine China-US relations .... As a major victim
of hacking in the world, China believes that the international community should inten-
sify the cooperation in jointly combating intemet hacking so as to safeguard intemet
security and protect the privacy of citizens in accordance with law."). See also Aaron
Shull, Cyber Espionage and International Law (Oct. 21, 2013) (paper presented at the
GigaNet: Global Internet Governance Academic Network, Annual Symposium 2013,
Bali) (noting that China's denial stifles the development of CIL about cyber espionage).
249. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 147, at xliii.
250. Id. See Khurts Bat v. Investigating Judge of the German Federal Court, 147 I.L.R.
633, 661 (Eng. High Ct. 2011) (explaining that because States usually deny that spying
has been undertaken on their behalf by diplomats, "the absence of such claims dimin-
ishes the prospect of establishing State practice on which customary international law
must depend".); Elizabeth H. Franey, Immunity, Individuals and International Law:
Which Individuals are Immune from the Jurisdiction of National Courts under Interna-
tional Law 236 (June 2009) (Thesis to the Department of Law of the London School of
Economics) (stating that "[e]xchange of spies who have been arrested in foreign states
are often arranged. States do not accept that their agents have been collecting informa-
tion for them. Usually the agent has a legitimate business reason for being in the foreign
state, and their state denies that they have been spying.").
251. Perina, supra note 150, at 542 ("Historically, governments were loath even to
acknowledge that they engaged in covert activity, especially in peacetime."); Marty Led-
erman, Major Development Concerning Transparency of the Use of Force in Yemen, JUST
SECURITY (May 14, 2014) https://www.justsecurity.org/10821/major-development-
transparency-force/?print [https://perma.cc/HHZ9-Z3SC] (noting that in the context of
the use of force, "the norm has become to neither confirm nor deny" rather than to issue
specific denials); see also Richard Norton Taylor, Why "Neither Confirm Nor Deny" Has
Become Untenable for British Spies, THE GUARDIAN (July 15, 2014), https://
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sought categorical assurances that the British Government had not author-
ized any activity "inconsistent with the Vienna Convention" 25 2 in its
embassy, namely, the installation of covert bugging devices when the
building was being refurbished. 25 3 No assurances were given, but it is
reported that the United Kingdom contacted Pakistan's Foreign Minister,
"underlining the importance of maintaining good relations between the
two countries, while neither confirming nor denying that an authorized
bugging operation had taken place."'2 54 In 2013, the Australian Prime Min-
ister responded to Indonesia's spying allegations by saying that "the Aus-
tralian government never comments on specific intelligence matters. This
has been the long tradition of government of both political persuasions and
I don't intend to change that today."2 55
For obvious reasons, NCND maintains a special relationship with
espionage. The response protects the identity of those engaged in spying
abroad and the nature of the operations in which they are engaged. NCND
has therefore been recognized as a legitimate practice by international
tribunals,2 56 and perhaps even as a plausible right in the recent Timor-Leste
v Australia case.2 5 7 Timor-Leste asserted that Australia had committed an
act of espionage against it in Narrabundah in 2004, and an Agent of Aus-
tralia replied that Australia NCND and requested the Court to dismiss the
matter.2 58 Pressed again to explain Australia's conduct, the Agent hinted
to the fact that the question of whether there was some international law
norm that States cannot collect intelligence, without making public the
particular security issue, was inseparable from the question of espionage,
an issue that was not before the Court.259 While the ICJ rendered no con-
www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jul/15/neither-confirm-nor-deny-british-
spies-edward-snowden-revelations [https://perma.cc/5VPS-X9HV] ("For decades, minis-
ters and officials have come up with the pat response, 'We can neither confirm, nor
deny', when asked about operations by M15, M16 and GCHQ.").
252. DENZA, supra note 243, at 186.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. CNN Staff, Indonesia voices anger at Australia alleged spying, CNN (Nov. 18,
2013), https://edition.cnn.com/2013/11/18/world/asia/indonesia-australia-spy-allega-
tions/index.htnl [https://perma.cc/Z7ZR-PNPC].
256. See, e.g., Kennedy v. U.K., App. No. 26839/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. c1 137 (2010) (The
court approved the government's "policy to 'neither confirm nor deny' [because this]
was important to ensure the overall effectiveness of surveillance operations."); Liberty v.
U.K., App. No. 58243/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 47 (2008) (where the Government adopted a
general policy of NCND with regards to allegations made in respect of surveillance);
Perina, supra note 150, at 542 ("Some states, including the United States and Israel,
typically offer 'no comment' in responding to specific allegations of intelligences activi-
ties or certain military conduct.").
257. See James R. Van de Velde, "Neither Confirm nor Deny" at Sea Still Alive and
Consistent with International Law, 45 NAVAL L. REv. 268, 268 (1998) (arguing that
"NCND reflects an international right that is one hundred and eighty-three years old
and is consistent with both customary and conventional international law.").
258. See Questions Relating to the Seizure and Detention of Certain Documents and
Data (Timor-Leste v. Austl.), Provisional Measures Order, 2014 I.C.J. 147, 1 2 (Mar. 3).
259. Id. 25.
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clusive ruling on the matter, some Judges looked favorably at NCND. 2 60
Be that as it may, NCND is not a breeding ground for customary espio-
nage exceptions. Again, by declining to endorse or defend their conduct,
spying States are undercutting the claim process of CIL. 2 6 1 Such response
is possible because, as alluded to by the Australian Agent, there is no inter-
national legal obligation to reveal the reasons for why espionage has been
conducted. 2 6 2 States may have a general right to plead the Fifth but, if they
want their actions to be law creating, they must forfeit this response and
present their claim unambiguously to the international society.
3. Mistakes
Where States are caught spying abroad, they often seek to excuse their
involvement in this activity on the basis of mistake. As Dubuouis notes,
aerial intrusions for espionage purposes are a remarkable illustration of
this trend,2 6 3 where States have historically been very careful to excuse
their violation of the territorial sovereignty of other States on the grounds
of "navigational mistakes. ' '2 64 For example, during the Cold War the USSR
frequently alleged that the US's use of spy planes within its national air-
space violated its right to territorial sovereignty. 2 65 Rather than admitting
espionage, the typical American response was that the pilot had simply lost
260. See id. 1 31 (dissenting opinion by Callinan, J.) ; id. ' 28 (dissenting opinion by
Greenwood, J.) (stating that Australia's right "to protect the safety of its officials must
also be regarded as plausible.").
261. See Perina, supra note 150, at 574.
262. Brian J. Egan, International Law and Stability in Cyberspace, 35 BERKELEY J. INT'L
L. 169, 177 (2017) (stating that "[D]espite the suggestion by some States to the con-
trary, there is no international legal obligation to reveal evidence on which attribution is
based prior to taking appropriate action."); Eric Donnelly, The United States-China EP-3
Incident: Legality and Realpolitik, 9 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 25, 34 (2004) ("[Sltates
have argued that states have no 'right' to request any flight details of aircraft over-flying
the high seas."); similarly, see Wright, supra note 56 (who stated that "There is no legal
obligation requiring a state to publicly disclose the underlying information on which its
decision to attribute hostile activity is based, or to publicly attribute hostile cyber activ-
ity that it has suffered in all circumstances.").
263. See Louis Dubuouis, L'erreur en droit international public, 9 ANNUAIRE FRANCAIS
DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 191, 215 (1963) (stating further that intrusive spy flights vio-
late international law). This has been a longstanding practice. See, e.g., "Force majeure"
and "Fortuitous Event" as Circumstances Precluding Wrongfulness: Survey of State Practice,
International Judicial Decisions and Doctrine- Study Prepared by the Secretariat, [1978] 2
Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 61, 102-03, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/315 (arguing that "[b]ad weather,
the malfunctioning of navigational instruments and other conditions of force majeure
are frequently invoked in diplomatic correspondence concerning aerial incidents" and
substantiating the assertion with the statements of German nationals involved in the
1913 incident between France and Germany, reporting that the airship "has lost the
direction owing to foggy weather" and was "in no way engaged in acts of espionage.");
Note to the Hungarian Government of March 17, 1953, in I.Cj. PLEADINGS, TREATMENT IN
HUNGARY OF AIRCRAFT OF UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (U.S. v. HUNGRY; U.S.A. v. U.S.S.R.)
(1954); Oliver J. Lissitzyn, The Treatment of Aerial Intruders in Recent Practice and Inter-
national Law, 47 AM. J. INT'L L. 559, 581 (1953) (discussing the C-47 incident between
the United States and Hungary).
264. Dubuouis, supra note 263, at 215 (speaking of "erreur de navigation excusable")
["excusable navigation mistake"] (our translation).
265. Id.
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his or her bearings.266 Similarly, when a Soviet submarine strayed into a
restricted military area within Sweden's territorial sea in 1981, the USSR
claimed that "while making a routine training cruise in the Baltic Sea, [a
submarine] went off course in conditions of poor visibility and ran
aground. '267 More recently, China alleged that its submarine entered
Japan's territorial sea "by mistake from a technical cause during its normal
training course."268 Political expedience readily explains this practice. By
justifying their actions on these grounds, States seek to negate their inten-
tion to spy and thereby shield themselves from embarrassment and inter-
national legal responsibility.269
The process of CIL formation is averse to mistakes. As just noted,
State conduct matters for custom formation only insofar as it "provides
clear evidence of how one State views the law."'270 Therefore, for such
practice to be relevant, it must be "deliberate or, at least, conscious."271
This logically excludes mistakes, accidents and other inadvertent acts. 272
Inadvertent repetition of mistakes can hardly lead to a settled practice
accompanied by a legal conviction.273 Thus, when a spying State excuses
its actions as a mistake, it vitiates that conduct's contribution to possible
customary espionage exceptions.
4. Extra-Legal Justifications
When confronted with compelling evidence pointing towards their
participation in espionage activities, at least one State, the United States,
has, on rare occasions, formally acknowledged its involvement in espio-
266. Edmondson, supra note 28, at 445 (noting that "the popular American response
is that the pilot lost his bearing.").
267. Sadurska, supra note 136, at 35 (further adding that the Swedish authorities did
not believe this statement and immediately delivered a protest to the Soviet
Ambassador).
268. Kraska, supra note 67, at 211.
269. Mistakes and material impossibility can be regarded as circumstances preclud-
ing wrongfulness. See Dubuouis, supra note 263, at 215-16 (explaining that States typi-
cally claim mistake when accused of spying).
270. See PATRICK DuMBERRY, THE FORMATION AND IDENTIFICATION OF RULES OF CUSTOM-
ARY INTERNATIONAL LAW IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAw 156 (James Crawford & John
S. Bell eds., 2016).
271. Id. See also Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Port. v. India) Judgment,
1960 I.CJ. 6, 82 (Apr. 12) (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Armand-Ugon) ("[A] deliberate
intention.., a common awareness reflecting the conviction.., as to [a] right."); Wood,
supra note 89, 70 ("The motivation behind a certain practice must be discernible in
order to identify a rule of customary international law."); Luigi Ferrari Bravo, Methodes
de recherche de la coutume internationale dans [a pratique des tats, 192 COLLECTED
COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INT'L L. 233, 261 (1985).
272. See COMM. ON FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY (GEN.) INT'L LAw, supra note 147, at 14
("[Pihysical acts are not always formal and deliberate manifestations of State practice.
For instance, a ship might be arrested by a minor official without proper instructions,
but this will still count as practice if it is not 'cancelled' by some higher authority.").
273. See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 147, at ILIV (stating that repeated
evidence of violations of that rule are not of nature to challenge the existence of a rule
where "this has been accompanied by excuses or justifications by the actors and/or con-
demnations by other States.").
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nage and has sought to justify it, thereby departing from the "old rules of
the game" 2 74 of denying allegations of espionage, NCND, or excusing that
conduct on the basis of mistake. Yet, crucially, these justifications have not
been framed in terms of permissive customary exceptions.
Take for example the U-2 affair, where on May 9, 1960, the U.S. Secre-
tary of State Herter explicitly admitted that the United States had sent spy
planes into the USSR's airspace as a measure to "lessen and to overcome
the danger of surprise attack."2 75 Many States vehemently rejected the
Herter Declaration on the basis that it amounted to an assertion of a new
right in favor of aerial espionage. For example, Poland explained before the
Security Council that such flights constituted a violation of international
law 276 and warned the international society of the declaration's dangerous
precedential value:
The statement of the Secretary of State which we heard on 9 May was
unprecedented in history, as it attributed to the United States the right of
espionage flights over the territory of the USSR for reasons of security....
At the moment when the Secretary of State pronounced those words the case
ceased to be an incident .... At this point what actually happened was that a
great, powerful State raised the violation of international law to the rank of
its official policy .... The new doctrine expressed in the statement of the
Secretary of State is an attempt to replace international law by the law of the
jungle .... [It] negates the fundamental principles of international law on
which the whole system of international relations is based, namely, the prin-
ciple of the sovereignty of States .... A violation of these principles cannot
and should not be justified by the interest of one State or even a group of
States.... There can be no exceptions to that rule.... That is why it cannot
be considered as a legal formula.2 7 7
As is well known, States concluded the U-2 affair constituted a violation of
the USSR's sovereignty, and subsequently, the United States reversed its
policy and determined that it would no longer use spy planes within other
States' territorial airspace. 2 78 Indeed, Secretary Herter had to concede that
the declaration was highly unusual, admitting that he knew of no prece-
dent in history where a State official had admitted to spying.27 9 What is
274. Falk, supra note 5, at VII.
275. Secretary Herter, United States Plane Downed in Soviet Union: Statement by Secre-
tary Herter, 42 DEP'T ST. BULL. 816, 816 (1960).
276. U.N. SCOR 858th mtg., supra note 28, cl 85 ("Any flight that takes place without
the permission of the State concerned, particularly an espionage flight, is a drastic
breach of treaty obligations; it is also a violation of the principle of sovereignty and of a
States frontiers; and finally it is a violation of the United Nations Charter, particularly
Articles 1, 2 and 78.").
277. Id. Jq 93-96, 98-99 ; see also Legal Aspects of Reconnaissance in Airspace and
Outer Space, supra note 202, at 1100.
278. See Senator John F. Kennedy and Vice President Richard M. Nixon: First Joint
Radio-Television Broadcast, Oct. 7, 1960, available at https://www.jfklibrary.org/
archives/other-resources/john-f-kennedy-speeches/2nd-nixon-kennedy-debate-
19601007 [https://perma.cc/HCE5-SGVF] (last visited Feb. 12, 2019)(during the Presi-
dential campaign of 1960, Senator Kennedy also admitted that the U-2 flights "were not
in accordance with international law.").
279. See SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE: EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CON-
FERENCE 26-27 (1960) (where the following exchange happened: "The Chairman: Mr.
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more, in response to a query by Senator of Louisiana at the Hearings before
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Secretary Herter conceded
that "all espionage is a violation of sovereignty, all forms of espionage." 280
Although not all forms of espionage violate international law, the U-2
incident should be understood as a crucial development for the CIL about
peacetime espionage, not least because it showed that pioneer States would
face significant hurdles in justifying their unilateral actions.
Again in 1982, the U.S. Ambassador to the UN explained before the
Security Council that the United States conducted regular reconnaissance
flights over Nicaraguan territory in order to "safeguard our own security
and that of other States which are threatened by the Sandinista Govern-
ment."2 8 1 It is not clear whether Ambassador Kirkpatrick justified these
acts on the basis that the Sandinista government represented a general
threat to the security of the United States or, more specifically, on the inter-
national law doctrine of self-defense. 28 2
A similar situation occurred in 2014 when US President Obama
responded to allegations that the NSA had been engaged in a global espio-
nage campaign. President Obama explained that, in the future, "unless
there is a compelling national security purpose, we will not monitor the
communications of heads of state and government of our close friends and
allies."2 8 3 As with the Kirkpatrick declaration, it is not clear whether Presi-
Secretary, you are a longtime devotee of international relations and thoroughly familiar
with precedents in this field. Is the public assumption of responsibility for espionage by
the head of a state the usual and customary practice among nations? Secretary Herter:
No; the general practice has been, I think, for a long period of time to deny any responsi-
bility whatever. The Chairman: Do you know of any precedent in our history or in the
history of any great nation in which the head of state has assumed personal responsibil-
ity for espionage activities? Secretary Herter: No; I do not know of any firsthand.").
280. Legal Aspects of Reconnaissance in Airspace and Outer Space, supra note 202, at
n.144 (quoting Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations on Events Incident
to the Summit Conference, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1960)).
281. U.N. SCOR, 37th Sess., 2335th mtg. 11 132, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2335 (March 25,
1982). Nicaragua rejected this claim both before the Security Council and before the
ICJ; see id. 1 86.
282. This is the view of Judge Schwebel. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Schwebel
referred to the Kirkpatrick Declaration and deemed the U.S. intelligence overflights to be
permissible acts of self-defense. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against
Nicaragua, supra note 13, 9 (dissenting opinion by Schwebel, J.) ("Are United States
support of the contras . . . as well as other measures such as intelligence overflights,
military and naval manoeuvres, and a trade embargo, unnecessary and disproportionate
acts of self-defence? I do not believe so."). It is generally accepted that acts of espionage
can be justified on the basis of self-defence where an armed attack occurs or is immi-
nent. See Forcese, supra note 14, at 199 ("[S]pying in response to the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and state-sponsored terrorism . . . is difficult to square
with the doctrinal law of self-defense. It is not clear how spying in aid of self-defense is
permissible where the right to self-defense is not yet triggered as a matter of interna-
tional law by, among other things, a sufficiently imminent armed attack."). For a
broader interpretation of when states can invoke the doctrine of self-defense to justify
their espionage activities, see Asaf Lubin, Espionage as a Sovereignty Right under Interna-
tional Law and its Limits, 24 INr'L L. STUDENTs ASS'N Q. 22 (2016).
283. Obama, supra note 139, at 139.
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dent Obama was relying upon the doctrine of self-defense 28 4 to justify
these forms of intelligence activities or, instead, whether he is appealing to
extra-legal justifications such as the need to protect national security.
For the purpose of the present discussion, it makes little difference as
to what basis Secretary Herter, Ambassador Kirkpatrick and President
Obama sought to justify espionage-neither ground provides evidence of
opinio juris to support the existence of customary exceptions in favour of
the permissibility of espionage. As we have explained, opinio juris requires
that States invoke CIL to justify their actions rather than extra-legal consid-
erations (such as security) or other legal bases (such as self-defense). 285
All in all, the pattern of CIL formation is aptly captured by the words
of Lord Denning: "Whenever a change is made, someone some time has to
make the first move. One country alone may start the process. Others may
follow. At first a trickle, then a stream, last a flood."'2 86 Thus, even if we
were to accept that the United States was ready to 'make the first move' on
at least a few occasions (which is doubtful as it justified its actions on
extra-legal considerations) these moves were not followed by a 'trickle' of
State practice, even less a 'stream' or a 'flood.'
It is not difficult to fathom why States have reacted this way. The prin-
ciple of reciprocity underpins CIL. As Byers observes, reciprocity "ensures
that any state claiming a right under general CIL accords that same right to
every other state, [thus] States will only claim rights which they are pre-
pared to see generalized. '2 8 7 Except for the United States, most States may
be motivated to spy for their own benefit, but reluctant to see these benefits
generalized to more powerful peers. We are thus led to conclude that there
is a lack of opinio juris on espionage.
5. Legal and Psychological 'Cannot'
Some have criticized this conclusion for being "naive" about the delica-
cies of international relations.28 8 The point would be that it is naive to
equate States' refusal to acknowledge or justify their spying activities with a
sense of legal wrong. Stone perhaps captured first the notion that States'
silence was not the result of a legal 'cannot' but instead a psychological 'can-
284. Or even on the grounds of necessity. See Rep. of the Comm. to the Gen. Assem-
bly, [20011 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 26, art. 25, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1.
285. See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, supra note
13, q 208 (The ICJ had to determine whether the provision of assistance to rebel groups
within other States had emerged as a right under CIL and which had thereby modified
the scope of the non-intervention principle. The Court rejected this contention, explain-
ing that while there was a number of instances of foreign intervention for the benefit of
forces opposed to the government of another State, such conduct had never been justi-
fied on the basis of a customary right but instead "expressly and solely by reference to
the 'classic' rules involved, namely, collective self-defense against an armed attack.").
286. Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, [1977] 1 Q.B. 529, 556 (C.A)
(Eng.).
287. James Crawford, Foreword to MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF
RULES IX, X (1999).
288. See Lotrionte, supra note 12, at 487-88.
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not.'28 9 In so doing, Stone distinguished between the legal 'cannot' (i.e.,
States are unwilling to justify their spying activities because they know they
are acting unlawfully under international law) and the psychological 'can-
not' (i.e., States are unwilling to justify their spying activities for reasons
other than acting unlawfully), and favored this latter view.290 Stone vividly
captures this idea: espionage ought to be seen "like some situations that
occasionally arise between friends ... when one of them does the sort of
thing about which it isn't really any use for them to talk. '291
This was recently echoed by Lotrionte, who argues that "[i]n not
acknowledging the spy, the sending state is not doing so necessarily
because of a sense that its actions are illegal, but rather in order to put off
what would be a very tense diplomatic conversation, but not necessarily a
violation of international law."'292
These observations inject a healthy dose of realism into our discussion
of customary exceptions. Indeed, States might refuse to justify their spying
activities for a myriad of reasons, chief amongst them is to avoid embar-
rassment and an indecorous subject. Another reason might be because
States "hold their spying capacities as closely guarded secrets." 293 Dis-
cussing spying per se or methods of spying with other States would neces-
sarily involve disclosing one's sources and capabilities. Even small
"disclosure of a source's identity could well impair intelligence gathering
and cause sources to 'close up like a clam.' 294
However, what we must not lose sight of is that on multiple occasions,
international tribunals such as the ICJ have determined that for customary
exceptions to form, State practice must be accompanied by opinio juris.2 9 5
More to the point, the psychological 'cannot' flies in the face of clear opinio
juris supporting the permissibility of certain intelligence collection acts.
A careful study of State practice shows that despite the psychological
'cannot,' States have not shied away from supporting the permissibility of
spying conducted in the high sea,2 9 6 in international airspace2 9 7 or in
289. Julius Stone, Legal Problems of Espionage in Conditions of Modern Conflict, in
ESSAYS ON ESPIONAGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 29, 39 (Roland J. Stanger ed., 1962).
290. Id. at 40.
291. Id. at 39.
292. Lotrionte, supra note 12, at 487. Lotrionte adds: "The fact that spies are often
given awards upon returning to their home country once PNGed from another state is
reflective of the sending state's belief that there is nothing illegal or dishonorable in
spying abroad." Respectfully, this is not the case. If anything, medals are reflective of
legitimacy, but not legality.
293. Deeks, supra note 10, at 314.
294. CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 175 (1985).
295. See, e.g., Talmon, supra note 38, at 420.
296. See, e.g., Sam Bateman, Hydrographic Surveying in Exclusive Economic Zones: Is it
Marine Scientific Research, in FREEDOM OF SEAS, PASSAGE RIGHTS AND THE 1982 LAw OF THE
SEA CONVENTION 105, 115 (Myron H. Nordquist et al. eds., 2009) (noting that the United
States "reserves the right to engage in military surveys outside foreign territorial seas
and archipelagic waters" and that the United Kingdom believes that States "have a right
to engage in military data gathering anywhere outside foreign territorial seas and
archipelagic waters without prior notice to, or permission from the coastal state."); Lis-
sitzyn, supra note 70, at 569 ("[I]nternational law does not forbid electronic reconnais-
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outer space. 298 While a full study of these statements cannot be under-
taken here, examples of express statements are available to show that these
acts are deemed legal by States.
For instance, following the RB-47 incident, the United Kingdom
repeatedly asserted before the Security Council that reconnaissance activi-
ties "are internationally permissible when conducted in international air-
sance from the high seas."); Liacouras, supra note 70, at 134 ("intelligence gathering on
vessels sailing in international waters is permitted in principle"); Raul Pedrozo, Military
Activities in the Exclusive Economic Zone: East Asia Focus, 90 ITrr'L L. STUD. 514, 531
(2014) (speaking of "abundant evidence of State practice that permits intelligence col-
lection beyond the territorial sea.").
297. See, e.g., Raul Pedrozo, Military Activities In and Over the Exclusive Economic
Zone, in FREEDOM OF SEAS, PASSAGE RIGHTS AND THE 1982 LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION
235, 240 (Myron H. Nordquist et al. eds., 2009) ("Long-standing state practice supports
the position that surveillance and reconnaissance operations conducted in international
airspace beyond the 12-nm territorial sea are lawful activities. Since the end of World
War 11, surveillance and reconnaissance operations in international airspace have
become a matter of routine."); Oliver Lissitzyn, Some Legal Implications of the U-2 and
RB-47 Incidents, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 135, 142 (1962) (quoting the diplomatic protest by the
USSR to the French Government of February 12, 1961, in which the Soviet government
stated that "the generally accepted norms of international law provide for the freedom of
flight in the airspace over the high seas, and no state, if it does not wish to be a violator
of international laws, has the right to limit this freedom.").
298. See, e.g., U.N. GAOR, First Committee, 17th Sess., 1289th mtg. at 13, U.N. Doc.
A/C.1/PV.1289 (Dec. 3, 1962) (Albert Gore, U.S. Representative stated "loibservation
from space is consistent with international law, just as is observation from the high
seas."); Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 17th Sess., 11th mtg., supra note
229, at 5 (Australia's representative stated "[i]t would seem absolutely clear that to
obtain information about the earth by means of a space vehicle did not per se involve
any breach of international law."); Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 17th
Sess., 10th mtg., supra note 234, at 4 ("The United Kingdom held that observation from
points outside of the territory of any State was not contrary to international law."); U.N.
GAOR, Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 17th Sess., 7th mtg. at 9, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.105/C.2/SR.7 (June 7, 1962) ("International law imposed no prohibition on the
observation of the earth from outer space, which was peaceful and did not interfere with
other activities on earth or in space."); Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11
September 1992 in the Case concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute
(El Sal./Hond.: Nicar. intervening), Verbatim Record, 29 (Sept. 9, 2003), https://
www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/127/127-20030909-ORA-01-00-BI.pdf [https://
perma.cc/S6X7-HN28] (where Agent for El Salvador stated "[slatellite photography does
not, of course, entail any breach of international law"); Arthur A. Stein, Constrained Sov-
ereignty: The Growth of International Intrusiveness, in THE NEW GREAT POWER COALITION:
TOWARD A WORLD CONCERT OF NATIONS 261, 269 (Richard Rosecrance ed., 2001) (citing
Nikita Khrushchev arguing "any nation in the world who wanted to photograph Soviet
areas by satellite was completely free to do so"); see also CHENG, supra note 31, at 579;
Carl Q. Christol, Remote Sensing and International Space Law, 16 J. SPACE L. 21, 21
(1988); CARL Q. CHRISTOL, THE 1986 REMOTE SENSING PRINCIPLES: EMERGING OR EXISTING
LAW 269 (1987); Ram Jakhu, International Law Governing the Acquisition and Dissemina-
tion of Satellite Imagery, 29 J. SPACE L. 65, 76-77 (2003); Ilias 1. Kuskuvelis, The Custom-
ary Legality of Military Space Observation and Proposals Towards its Codification, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-THIRD COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 305, 308
(1990); Soraghan, supra note 239, at 489 (stating "the legal characterization of recon-
naissance satellites, as is witnessed by the oftstated argument that in less than ten years
state practice has determined that sovereignty does not extend to outer space.").
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space or international waters."2 99 The legality of spying on the high seas
was again reaffirmed in 2017 during the United States presidential elec-
tions, when a Russian spy ship was spotted lurking in international waters
off the United States East Coast-something even United States officials
considered lawful.3 0 0
Stone's claim, then, that States' silence should be understood as a psy-
chological impossibility in the face of an indecorous subject cannot be sus-
tained when one considers that the psychological 'cannot' has not
precluded States from asserting the legality of at least some forms of espio-
nage, that is, precisely the ones that are unambiguously lawful. The psy-
chological 'cannot' really is a legal 'cannot.,
C. Other Sources of Opinio Juris
The absence of express opinio juris in favor of espionage exceptions
points towards the conclusion that peacetime espionage "appear[s] to be a
case in which frequent practice has not established a rule of law because
the practice is accompanied not by a sense of right but by a sense of
wrong."30 1 The following section explores whether other sources of opinio
juris exist, namely (i) negative State practice by injured States and (ii)
domestic law and national decisions, which can be used to evidence the
existence of customary espionage exceptions.
1. Negative State Practice
A segment of the current literature turns the opinio juris requirement
on its head and argues that the failure of injured States to denounce espio-
nage activities as unlawful is reflective of their view that such conduct is
lawful under CIL. The main argument is that, "[i]n terms of the actual
volume of this activity ... the number of formal protests which have been
lodged have been relatively insignificant" 30 2 and this thus indicates "a
deep but reluctant admission of the lawfulness of such intelligence gather-
ing, when conducted within customary normative limits." 30 3 Said differ-
ently, this literature argues that customary espionage exceptions can be
established on the basis of negative State practice, i.e. abstentions and
omissions.
299. U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 883d mtg. c1 136, U.N. Doc. S/PV.883 and Add.1 (July
26, 1960) (remarks by U.K. representative, Pierson Dixon).
300. See Christine Hauser, Trump, the Russian Ship and Suspicious Minds, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/16/us/politics/russian-ship-vessel-
usa.html (according to Captain Andrew Tucci from the United States Coast Guard, "'yes,
Russian vessels transit through international waters ... and certainly American vessels
transit through international waters, and it is a legitimate and lawful activity that doesn't
raise any particular concerns.").
301. Wright, supra note 51, at 17.
302. McDougal et al., supra note 12, at 394.
303. Id.; see also Deeks, supra note 10, at 305 (arguing that "[s]tates generally refrain
from characterizing spying by other states as internationally illegal, at least when that
spying collects intelligence about core state activities such as military capabilities.");
Lotrionte, supra note 12, at 475.
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For instance, Cohen-Jonathan and Kovar identify six incidents
between 1877 and 1946 where injured States reacted tepidly to intrusive
acts of foreign secret agents.30 4 Colby paints a similar picture in relation to
diplomatic spying, arguing that "[w]hile such tolerance is not uniform
among all participants in the international arena, and remains low, if at all
in situations of intense crisis, it is nonetheless perceptible. '30 5 Whereas
this argument was, at least historically, confined to spying by diplomats
and secret agents, it has since picked up momentum and is nowadays used
to establish the customary basis of other forms of espionage.
30 6
This line of argument is problematic for two reasons. At the outset, it
puts the cart before the horse: pursuant to Nicaragua, the crucial question
is whether the spying States claimed to be acting pursuant to customary
espionage exceptions. This being said, advocates of the toleration argu-
ment are not entirely mistaken in looking at the injured States' reaction;
opinio juris ought to be sought with respect to "the interested States, both
those who carry out the practice in question and those in a position to
respond to it."3 0 7 Inaction by injured States must nevertheless be of a cer-
tain quality in order to qualify as opinio juris. In Fitzmaurice's words,
[c]learly, absence of opposition is relevant only in so far as it implies con-
sent, acquiescence or toleration on the part of the States concerned; but
absence of opposition per se will not necessarily or always imply this. It
depends on whether the circumstances are such that opposition is called for
because the absence of it will cause consent or acquiescence to be
presumed.30 8
304. Grard Cohen-Jonathan & Robert Kovar, L'espionnage en temps de paix, 6
ANNUAIRE FRANCA1S DE DROIT INT'L, 239, 251-54 (1960).
305. Jonathan E. Colby, The Developing Law on Gathering and Sharing Security Intelli-
gence, 1 YALE J. INT'L L. 49, 88 (1974).
306. See, e.g., id. at 67 (noting that States "appear to tolerate the entry of each other's
aircraft within the airspace above their own territorial seas for the purpose of 'passive'
observation and monitoring," and that by exchanging spies, States demonstrate their
toleration of espionage); Christopher D. Baker, Tolerance of International Espionage: A
Functional Approach, 19 Am. U. INT'L L. REv. 1091, 1095 (2003) (speaking of a "wide-
spread, international tolerance" of espionage.). See also Deeks, supra note 6, at 646
(arguing "[iun the face of the longstanding practice by states of spying on each other...
one can argue that states and their officials are on notice that they are subject to foreign
intelligence activity and, where they have not objected to it, have tacitly consented to
being the targets of that activity.").
307. Wood, supra note 89, 1 64. Such acquiescence by injured States, in the words of
the ICJ in the Gulf of Maine, could be "equivalent to tacit recognition manifested by
unilateral conduct which the other party may interpret as consent."; Delimitation of the
Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can./U.S.), Judgment, 1984 I.CJ. 246, 1
130 (Dec. 18). See also Report of the International Law Commission: Seventieth Session,
supra note 88, Conclusion 10(3) ("Failure to react over time to a practice may serve as
evidence of acceptance as law (opinio juris).").
308. Gerald Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice,
1951-54: General Principles and Sources of Law, 30 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 33 (1953)
(emphasis added). See also Report of the International Law Commission: Seventieth Ses-
sion, supra note 88, Conclusion 10, 8 ("it is essential that a reaction to the practice in
question would have been called for").
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And there is the rub for espionage. As this practice is almost always
committed in secret, it is likely that States are not fully aware of the intru-
sive espionage acts committed on their territory, which means that they
cannot protest against this conduct. Where there is no opportunity to pro-
test, silence cannot be interpreted as acquiescence.
To be sure, all States seem generally aware of the widespread and long-
standing nature of espionage, but as their puzzled reactions have periodi-
cally shown (following the Echelon program revelations in 2000309 or the
Snowden revelations in 2013) it is simply not the case that States are
always aware of the exact nature and true extent of espionage activities
conducted against them with sophisticated means.
A second circumstance that may explain inaction by injured States
rests on the tu quoque doctrine. As a 1999 memorandum from the US
Department of Defense notes, "[tihe lack of strong international legal sanc-
tions for peacetime espionage may also constitute an implicit application of
the international law doctrine called 'tu quoque' (roughly, a nation has no
standing to complain about a practice in which it itself engages). ' '3 10 This
seems particularly true for the most widespread forms of espionage
amongst States, e.g., diplomatic espionage, 3 1 1 secret agents 3 12 and cyber
309. Report on the Existence of a Global System for the Interception of Private and
Commercial Communications (ECHELON Interception System) (2001/2098 (INI)) EUR.
PARL. Doc. A5-0264/2001 (July 11, 2001), at 11 (noting that many senior Community
figures, including European Commissioners claimed to be unaware of the existence of
the ECHELON program). See also Dimitri Yernault, De la fiction d la realitt: le pro-
gramme d'espionnage electronique global 'chelon' et la responsabilite internationale des
Etats au regard de la Convention Europtenne des Droits de l'Homme, 1 REVUE BELGE DE
DROIT INT'L 137, 138 (2000).
310. See DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 203, at 46. See also Wrange, supra note 30, at 15
("[E]spionage by one state may be considered to be an estoppel against that state if it
raises a claim against another state that engages in similar conduct.").
311. Toleration is all the more understandable because, for receiving States to uncover
espionage by foreign diplomats, they might have to subject those diplomats to some
form of surveillance, which can violate the VCDR. A certain degree of toleration
between States is thus in order. See Mohammed Helal, 'We're on the Air!' Michael Flynn,
Sergey Kislyak and the Paradoxes of Diplomatic Immunities, OPINIO Jules (Feb 21, 2017),
http://opiniojuris.org/2017/02/21/were-on-the-air-michael-flynn-sergey-kislyak-and-
the-paradoxes-of-diplomatic-immunities/ [https://perma.cc/9BRM-FC2Q] (adding that
"this, I suspect, is part of the reason why states have tolerated the practice of surveil-
lance of diplomats. States recognize and uphold the general principles of the inviolabil-
ity and immunity of diplomatic agents, while expecting and tolerating a degree of
encroachment on the confidentiality of diplomatic communications as a necessary anti-
dote to . . .spying.").
312. Espionage by undercover agents abroad is so widespread that States have pro-
ceeded under a legal fiction whereby the spy's individual responsibility is triggered in
lieu of the sending States' responsibility. See Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 3 (2005) (holding
that spies cannot enforce their secret contracts with the U.S. government); Vavilov v.
Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [20171 F.C. 132, 90 (Can.) (noting that illegal
secret agents cannot be considered employees of a Foreign government even if they
gather intelligence in the same way that official diplomats do). See also Delupis, supra
note 84, at 70 (arguing that the responsibility of the sending States for its secret agents
spying abroad almost always remain latent); Quincy Wright, Legal Aspects of the U-2
Incident, 54 Am. J. INT'L L. 836, 851 (1960) ("[S]ince states are acting ultra vires in
authorizing [aerial espionage] in time of peace, they cannot protect their agents from
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This is again illustrated by the U-2 incident, where members of the
international society criticized the USSR's condemnation of the United
States' espionage activities given its own longstanding espionage. 31 3 Dur-
ing the incident the United States cited around 360 convictions of Soviet
spies in courts around the world, and States' disapproval of the USSR was
felt before the Security Council: "if the U-2 incident is to be condemned, it
is certainly not for the Soviet Union to cast the first stone."
31 4
But while espionage is at times tolerated by the international society,
on many other occasions States have invoked the language of international
law to condemn this activity, further militating against the emergence of
permissive CIL exceptions. For instance, this was most recently evidenced
in the cyber context by a wide array of statements by States in reaction to
Edward Snowden's revelations that the United States' NSA had been
engaged in a massive, global cyber espionage campaign. The Brazilian
President Dilma Rousseff was clear in her view that the NSA's conduct con-
stituted an unlawful intrusion into Brazil's territorial sovereignty. 31 5 Bra-
zil's objections to this unlawful activity were communicated to the United
States by "demanding explanations, apologies and guarantees that such
acts or procedures will never be repeated again."'31 6 In the same vein, Bra-
zilian Justice Minister described the surveillance as "an attack on [Brazil's]
sovereignty. 3 17
Similarly, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Uruguay, and Venezuela, channel-
ing their views through the Pro-Tempore President of MERCOSUR, submit-
ted a Note Verbale to the UN Secretary-General "[c]ondemning the acts of
espionage carried out by the intelligence agencies of the United States of
America... which constitute unacceptable behaviour that violates our sov-
ereignty."' 3 18 Separately, the Foreign Minister of Venezuela explained
before the Security Council that it rejected "the actions of global espionage
[criminal] prosecutions beyond the usual demand for fair trial under the municipal law
of the state conducting the trial.").
313. See Wright, supra note 51, at 20. See also Wright, supra note 312, at 849.
314. See U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 858th mtg., supra note 28, at 15.
315. See Julian Borger, Brazilian President: US Surveillance a 'Breach of International
Law', THE GuARDLIN (Sept. 24, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/
24/brazil-president-un-speech-nsa-surveillance [https://perma.cc/RQA4-LKRK] (quot-
ing President Rousseff: "Tampering in such a manner in the affairs of other countries is
a breach of international law and is an affront to the principles that must guide the
relations among them, especially among friendly nations. A sovereign nation can never
establish itself to the detriment of another sovereign nation.").
316. President of the Federative Republic of Brazil, Statement by H. E. Dilma Rous-
seff, President of the Federative Republic of Brazil, U.N. GAOR, 68th Sess., at 2 (Sept.
24, 2013), available at https://gadebate.un.org/en/68/brazil [https://perma.cc/WP5Y-
2SL9].
317. Brazil and Mexico Probe Claims US Spied on Presidents, BBC NEws (Sept. 2, 2013),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-23938909 [https://perma.cc/FAL3-
A6ZN].
318. Note Verbale dated 22 July 2013 from the Permanent Mission of the Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N.
Doc. A/67/946 (July 29, 2013), at 2.
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carried out by the government of the United States, which undermine the
sovereignty of States" and called upon "the United Nations [to] punish and
condemn this violation of international law."'3 19 In addition, the Bahamian
Foreign Minister asked what the "high ideals of territorial integrity, sover-
eignty and respect for the rule of law actually mean in practice" in light of
such massive espionage. 320 Lastly, before the UN General Assembly, Indo-
nesia noted its "strong position against extraterritorial surveillance
because it was a violation of international law."'3 2 1 Hence, in the words of
Chesterman: "if the vast majority of States both decry it and practice it,
state practice and opinio juris appear to run in opposite directions."3 22
2. Domestic Law and National Decisions
Given the absence of opinio juris supporting customary espionage
exceptions, some scholars draw on domestic law authorizing espionage. 3 2 3
Such practice is a weak reed on which to establish opinio juris. For domes-
tic law to reflect acceptance of law, States must have enacted that law with
the belief that the acts of espionage were lawful under international law. It
is telling that even those States that have enacted such laws harbor doubts
about their validity under international law.
For example, when the United States enacted FISA in 1978 to permit
electronic surveillance directed at diplomatic premises on American soil, it
had to concede that the view which held that the VCDR authorized these
activities was "one about which reasonable persons may harbor some
319. U.N. SCOR, 68th Sess., 7015 mtg. at 8, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7015 (Resumption 1)
(Aug. 6, 2013).
320. See Rashad Rolle, Lawyers to Act in N.S.A. Spy Row, TRIBUNE 242 (June 5, 2014),
http://www.tribune242.com/news/2014/jun/05/lawyers-act-ns-spy-row/ [https://
perma.cc/6K2D-WEJ7].
321. Press Release, General Assembly, Third Committee Approves Text Titled "Right
to Privacy in the Digital Age", as It Takes Action on 18 Draft Resolutions, U.N. Press
Release GA/SHC/4094 (Nov. 26, 2013). More expressions of opinio juris exist in this
respect. See, e.g., Statement by Dr. the Honourable Ralph E. Gonsalves, Prime Minister
of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines to the United Nations, General Debate of the U.N.
General Assembly, 68th Sess., at 12 (Sept. 27, 2013) (rejecting electronic espionage "as
illegal, a violation of diplomatic conventions, and an affront to the comity of nations.");
Statement by H.E. Mr. Bruno Rodriguez Parrilla, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the
Republic of Cuba, on behalf of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States,
General Debate of the U.N. General Assembly, 68th Sess., at 4 (Sept. 26, 2013) ("The
global espionage against CELA member countries ... is a violation of the principle of
sovereignty of States and International Law.").
322. Chesterman, supra note 4, at 1072.
323. See, e.g., Lotrionte, supra note 12, at 488 ("Given... that most states have passed
domestic legislation establishing some form of legal authority for such clandestine activ-
ities, it would seem that there exists opinio juris on the practice of espionage."). For
domestic law and custom, compare Fisheries Jurisdiction, supra 153, at 131 (the Court's
judgment relied on the legislation of certain States having adopted the ten-mile rule
concerning the delimitation of the territorial sea but could not find sufficient evidence
of a "general" practice) with Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.: Greece
intervening), Judgment 2012 I.CJ. 99, '1 70 & 88 (Feb. 3) (where the latter paragraph
excludes the relevance of an isolated example of legislation for the purpose of establish-
ing the existence of practice.).
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doubt."324
Also illustrative are the 2015 legislative developments in Canada. As
previously mentioned, Canada amended its Canadian Security Intelligence
Service Act to authorize intelligence collection abroad "without regard to
any other law, including that of any foreign state."'3 2 5 It is telling that in
the House of Commons' debates, numerous MPs expressed serious con-
cerns about this language, to the point that all opposition parties agreed on
an amendment to delete it in order "to remove any contradiction with inter-
national law and the explicit granting of power to Canadian courts to
authorize illegal activity in other States."' 32 6 Tempers flared over this
"extremely extraordinary" 32 7 language, while one MP argued that the "lan-
guage is so broad and so offensive in many ways to international law that I
cannot image the courts would look favourably upon it."3 2 8 Conspicu-
ously absent from the debates is the assertion that espionage abroad is a
lawful international activity.
Similarly, Switzerland readily admits that extraterritorial espionage
authorized by its 2017 Loi sur le renseignement is problematic as it may be
constrained "to some extent" by several rules of international law, includ-
ing the VCDR. 32 9 On another occasion, the Swiss Dglegations des commis-
sions de gestion des Chambres federales simply acknowledged to the Federal
Council that it did not know whether technical eavesdropping abroad was
regulated by international law.3 30 This demonstrates that while States may
324. Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE
ACT OF 1978, H.R. Rep. No. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 70 (1978) ("Administration witnesses
testified that, in their view, the activities authorized by the bill are not prohibited by the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The committee is of the same view.").
325. Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-23.
326. HC Debates, 41st Parliament, 2d session, Vol. 147, No. 166, at 10869 (Jan. 30,
2015) (Can.).
327. HC Debates, 41st Parliament, 2d session, Vol. 147, No. 157, at 10311 (Dec. 8,
2014) (Can.).
328. Id. at 10313.
329. See Conseil fid&ral, 14.022 Message concernant la loi sur le renseignement, FF
2029, 2154 (2014) (Switz.). Switzerland's views are ambiguous. See generally Samantha
Besson & Odile Ammann, La pratique Suisse relative d la determination du droit interna-
tional coutumier, 21 CAHIERS FRIBOURGEOIS DE DROIT EUROPPEN 91 (2016) (citing the Legal
Opinion of March 10, 2009 by the Swiss Federal Department of Justice and Police and
the Directorate of International Law stating that "States generally do not react to acts of
espionage with reprisals, that is, they treat espionage as inimical acts rather than acts
contrary to international law") (our translation); Id. at 104 (citing the Note of November
1st 2013 by the Directorate of International Law to the Swiss Federal Department of
Justice and Police, stating that "customary international law tolerates activities of peace-
time espionage to a certain extent.") (our translation). Switzerland's method of identifi-
cation of custom appears to rest mostly on negative State practice (i.e., abstentions and
omissions); it does not consider other sources of State practice as it relates to spying.
330. See D(1kgations des commissions de gestion des Chambres f~d~rales, Systeme
d'interception des communications par satellites du Dipartement f~d~ral de la ddfense,
de la protection de la population et des sports (projet Onyx) 1377 (Nov. 10, 2003)
(Switz.) (explaining explicitly that it did not know whether technical eavesdropping
abroad constitutes (a) an intrusion and thus a violation of the principles of territoriality;
(b) if the interception is effectively conducted in Switzerland; or (c) rather in outer space
where the communications satellites are located, in which case there would be no viola-
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authorize espionage under national law, they do not necessarily believe
that such conduct is permissible under international law.
In addition, a growing body of national decisions offsets contrary
opinio juris derived from domestic laws.3 3 ' The case law of various
national courts has made it clear that territorially intrusive forms of espio-
nage and diplomatic espionage violate international law. 3 32 For instance,
the Dutch Special Court of Cassation in the 1949 In Re Flesche case, which
concerns the arrest of a German spy immediately prior to the German
invasion of the Netherlands, considered that peacetime espionage "consti-
tutes an international delinquency by that State against another State for
which it is answerable under international law."3 3 3 The almost complete
absence of contrary case law is also significant. 334
Another important example is the Federal Court of Canada's decision,
which recognized the absence of a customary espionage exception in 2008
when it refused to grant the CSIS a warrant to undertake espionage activi-
ties on the soil of foreign States.335 In that case, CSIS had explicitly argued
that State practice of territorially intrusive forms of intelligence had given
rise to a customary exception, to which the Court responded that it was not
persuaded that "in the national security context, the practice of 'intelli-
gence-gathering operations' in foreign States is recognized as a 'customary
practice' in international law."'3 36
tion of the target States' sovereignty. Nonetheless, the Report considered that intelli-
gence collection was limited by international human rights law.). French authorities
seem to concur with this view. See Arthur Paecht, Les systtmes de surveillance et
d'interception electroniques pouvant mettre en cause la securitg nationale, at 50, Ile
Assemblee Nationale Impressions, Rep. No. 2623 (Oct. 11, 2000) (noting that no inter-
national regime prohibits interception of communications between States).
331. National decisions play a dual role in relation to custom, not only as State prac-
tice and opinio juris, but also as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of CIL
when they consider the existence of customary rules. See Wood, supra note 89, at 55;
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, supra note 323, 1 77.
332. See supra note 48 and accompanying text for other relevant decisions.
333. In re Flesche, supra note 48, at 272.
334. But see Espionage Prosecution Case, Case No. 2 BGs 38/91, Bundesgerichtshof
[BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Jan. 30, 1991 (Ger.), reprinted in 94 Itrr'L L. REP. 69,
74-75 (1994) (where the Federal Supreme Court of Germany held that espionage is
neither lawful nor unlawful).
335. Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act (Re), supra note 182, '111 27, 53. See
also Craig Forcese, Triple Vision Accountability and Outsourcing of CSIS Intercepts, NAT'L
SEC. L. (Dec. 6, 2013), http://craigforcese.squarespace.com/national-security-law-blog/
2013/12/6/triple-vision-accountabilityand-the-outsourcing-of-csis-int.html [https://
perma.cc/2RFD-RHFR]. See generally Oonagh E. Fitzgerald, The Globalized Rule of Law
and National Security: An Ongoing Question for Coherence, 65 U. NEW BRUNSWICK L.J. 40
(2014).
336. In re Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, supra note 182, at 1 53. This was
confirmed later in another judgment of the Federal Court. See X (Re), 2009 F.C. 1058,
[2010] 1 F.C.R. 460, '1 65 (Can.) (stating that "In CSIS (Re), above, at paragraph 54,
Justice Blanchard held that '[n]o other basis under international law' had been put
before him to warrant displacing the principles of sovereign equality, non-intervention
and territoriality. CSIS had argued that customary international practice as it relates to
intelligence gathering operations in a foreign state constituted an exception to principles
of territorial sovereignty.").
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Conclusion
For many years, international legal scholars insisted that there was lit-
tle interaction between international law and espionage. This argument is
no longer taken seriously. Nowadays, scholars readily admit that interna-
tional law applies to espionage, and accept that certain forms of espionage
run afoul of various prohibitive international legal rules. But the battle-
lines have been redrawn. Scholars wishing to perverse espionage as a
national security tool have instead advanced the argument that, even if cer-
tain forms of espionage violate international law, this conduct is neverthe-
less lawful due to the existence of permissive CIL exceptions.
This Article debunks this thesis. This Article demonstrates that
neither of the two elements necessary for customary espionage exceptions
to ripen are present-public State practice and opinio juris. Although
States engage in espionage on a regular basis, they do so in secret, which
precludes such conduct from qualifying as State practice under CIL. Even
if we accept for the sake of argument that there is patchy and anecdotal
evidence of public State practice, States have nevertheless failed to issue
unambiguous expressions of opinio juris in support of this practice.
If States wish to construct customary rights of peacetime espionage in
exception to primary rules of international law, they are perfectly entitled
to do so. However, it behooves them to do so openly by claiming custom-
ary rights to spy,3 3 7 instead of leveraging the tenderly nurtured POS sur-
rounding past and new means and methods of espionage. Our
conclusions are summarized in Table 1 below.
3 38
To conclude, perhaps it is helpful to refer to a now classical metaphor.
The emergence of a CIL norm has often been discussed in terms of the
emergence of a footpath in a wild field.3 3 9 This metaphor has its limita-
tions, but the take-home point is edifying. In the words of Lowe:
Regular following of the same track establishes an identifiable path, whether
it be made by a few people or by many; and if there is an understanding that
the path should be followed, it will be a clear path with little or no sign of
people straying from it or trying to make new, competing paths.
3 40
The essence of the problem is this. Customary espionage exceptions
have yet to clear a path through the legal wilderness. If the path-takers
zigzag so that there are no clear tracks; if they are careful to cover their
337. See Cheng, supra note 31, at 425-56. See also Wright, supra 56, who recognized
the danger in maintaining this POS in cyberspace ("The very pervasiveness of cyber
makes silence from states on the boundaries of acceptable behaviour in cyberspace
unsustainable. If we stay silent, if we accept that the challenges posed by cyber technol-
ogy are too great for the existing framework of international law to bear, that cyberspace
will always be a grey area, a place of blurred boundaries, then we should expect cyber-
space to continue to become a more dangerous place.").
338. This Article attempts only to investigate the lex lata of customary espionage
exceptions, building on incidents available in open sources. While it proceeds holisti-
cally, Table 1 draws appropriate distinctions between different forms of spying.
339. See, e.g., CHARLES DE VISSCHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
149 (P.E. Corbett trans., 1960).
340. VAUGtAN LowE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 21 (2015).
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footprints; and if they consistently deny following new tracks when they
are caught in the act, then there can be no identifiable paths and no under-
standing that they should be followed.
Table 1: Customary Exceptions for Acts of Intelligence Collection
Breached Rule(s) Objective Subjective Customary
Constituent Acts or Principle(s) Element Element Exception
Territorially Principle of terri- Longstanding Subjective ele- No exception
intrusive acts by torial integrity and widespread, ment does not
undercover agent but practice is support legality
(with no diplo- not uniform nor
matic or consu- public
lar status) in the
territory of the
injured State
Territorially Principle of terri- Widespread, but Subjective ele- No exception
intrusive acts in torial integrity practice is not ment does not
the national air- and Chicago uniform nor support legality
space of the Convention public
injured State
Territorially Principle of terri- Widespread, but Subjective ele- No exception
intrusive acts in torial integrity practice is proba- ment does not
the territorial and article bly not uniform support legality
waters of the 19(2)(c) nor public
injured State UNCLOS
'Diplomatic' espi- VCDR, notably Longstanding Subjective ele- No exception
onage art. 3(d), 21, 24, and widespread, ment does not
and 41(1) but practice is support legality
not uniform nor
public
'Consular' espio- VCCR, notably Longstanding Subjective ele- No exception
nage art. 31, 33, 55(1) and widespread, ment does not
and 55(2) but practice is support legality
not uniform nor
public
Remote access Possibly in Nascent Nascent Insufficient data
cyber espionage breach of the to conclude for
principle of terri- now
torial integrity
Reconnaissance Outer space free- Longstanding, Subjective ele- N/A
from outer space dom allows for uniform, wide- ment supports
such conduct spread and pub- legality
lic
Reconnaissance High sea free- Longstanding, Subjective ele- N/A
from interna- dom allows for uniform, wide- ment supports
tional waters such conduct spread and pub- legality
lic
Reconnaissance Freedom of flight Longstanding, Subjective ele- N/A
from interna- in international uniform, wide- ment supports
tional airspace air space allows spread and pub- legality
for such conduct lic
Blanket espio- N/A N/A Subjective ele- N/A
nage exception ment confirms
that 'peacetime
espionage' is not
a legal category
